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SOCIAL SECURITY, TAXATION LAW,
AND REDISTRIBUTION:
DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM@
By ALISON MC* AD RICK KREVER**
While it is now generally accepted that some redistribution of economic power
is a legitimate goal of government, there is no consensus as to the type of
redistribution that should be pursued. In the absence of a clear redistributive
goal, it is impossible to evaluate critically current law, or make
recommendations. for change. In the first part of this article, we examine
alternative models of redistribution and advocate a preferred model, namely,
redistribution to promote equality of opportunity and to recognize periods of
vulnerability. We then evaluate the operation of Australian social security law
and taxation law in light of that objective. We conclude that, although changes
made in the 1980s were positive, they were inadequate in terms of the goal we
propose. Following is an analysis of the changes required if the social security
and tax systems are to work" together efficiently in furtherance of effective
redistribution. The final part of the paper applies the analysis to the case study
of retirement savings and incomes, and proposes fundamental reforms to the
current tax system with respect to these questions.
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I. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
At the beginning of this century, state intervention in the
country's economic and social life was limited. The tax base was both
simple and small. Macroeconomic management by government was
almost unknown, apart from public works projects and tariff
manipulation. Redistribution was largely limited to indirect transfers
from the politically inept to the politically adept as those in power
manipulated tariffs and excise duties to favour the sectors of their
principal supporters.
On the threshold of the twenty-first century, state intervention is
a pervasive component of virtually all aspects of the country's economy
and social systems. It seeks to accomplish a multitude of sometimes
complementary, and equally as often, contradictory objectives. The
characteristic common to all state intervention is its redistributive effect,
whether intended or unintended. Any law that favours one group
prejudices another; any intercession puts those who profited from the
unimpaired market at a relative disadvantage or in a strengthened
position; and any endorsement of the free market reinforces the position
of those who have used the biased marketplace to extract wealth from
others.
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The growing significance and volume of interventionist
legislation over the century has complemented society's changing
perception of the purpose of redistributive policies. The legitimacy of
redistribution as an objective of government policy is now generally
accepted, as are the social security and taxation systems designed to
achieve that objective. At the same time, however, there is little
agreement on the type and extent of redistribution to which the social
security and taxation systems should aspire. But unless one identifies a
coherent model of redistribution, there is no benchmark against which
the operation of the current systems can be evaluated.
In Part II of this paper, we develop a set of objectives and a
strategy for the achievement of a more equitable Australian society at
the end of the twentieth century. The redistributive goal we advocate is
equality of economic opportunity. The closing section of this part
identifies the relative contributions that the social security system and
the tax system can make to the achievement of this objective.
This strategic approach to redistribution establishes the
framework for the remainder of the paper. In Part III, we discuss the
recent evolution of social security and tax laws and outline their central
features. In Part IV, we evaluate the operation of the social security and
tax systems in the light of the redistributive objective discussed earlier.
We conclude that although some progress has been made, the current
systems still fail to achieve this redistributive objective. They have, at the
same time, seriously compromised the opportunities for making
Australia's economy more efficient and, as a consequence, impaired the
potential for improving the nation's economic well-being, thus making
the redistributive objective all the more difficult to achieve. In Part V of
the paper, we briefly outline an agenda for reform of the social security
and taxation systems in light of the model.
Finally, in Part VI of the paper, we use a specific case study to
show exactly how the social security and tax systems, working together,
fail in one important area: the provision of adequate income during
retirement. We also explain the changes that should be made in that
area if social security and tax law are to accomplish the redistributive
goal.
1 Indeed, it must be conceded that the consensus about the desirability of redistribution in
some fomi that has prevailed since the Second World War has become somewhat precarious in the
face of continual challenge by the New Right since the recessionary shocks of the 1970s.
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II. THE REDISTRIBUTIVE FUNCTION
A. Redistributive Aims
Public finance literature in the Musgrave tradition2 identifies
three interventionist policies that government pursues in order to
increase the welfare of the community. First, government intervenes
directly in the economy in order to correct for market failure, improve
efficiency by dealing with externalities, and encourage the production
and consumption of "merit" goods. Second, it manipulates the economy
indirectly in order to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium in the form of
acceptable levels of inflation and desirable levels of employment. And
third, it intervenes both directly and indirectly in order to correct
unacceptable inequalities in ownership of and access to economic
resources, in the capacity to consume certain goods and services, and in
the ability to participate in the activities commonly accepted as necessary
for membership in the community.3 These redistributive aims reflect a
consensus that the distribution achieved through the market reward
system is not just.
The social security and tax systems are two instruments that
governments use to carry out their redistributive function. The degree
of redistribution that a government pursues depends on which of the
various definitions of an "equitable" distribution it accepts. Equity,
properly speaking, consists of the unequal treatment of unequals
(vertical equity) and the equal treatment of equals (horizontal equity).4
The concept of an equitable distribution, however, is essentially a social
and value laden one,5 about which opinions can differ markedly. If there
are many who believe that the notion of an equitable distribution implies
the attainment of some state of equality, there are many who do not.
Some common definitions of the appropriate goal of redistribution are
as follows:
2 R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1959).
3 J.H.H. Rogers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution" (1969) 59 Am. Econ. Rev. 542; R.
Musgrave, "The Financing of Social Policy in Market Economies" in G. Terny & A. Culyer, ads.,
Public Finance and Social Policy (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985) 261.
4 Social Security Review, Issues in Assistance for Families-Horizontal and Vertical Equity
Considerations (Discussion Paper No. 5) by P. Whiteford (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1988).
5 A.B. Atkinson, The Economics oflnequality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
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1. Equality of outcomes: everyone achieves the same outcome;
2. Equality of opportunity: everyone has the same opportunity to
achieve a given outcome;
3. Equality in the use of resources: resources, particularly those
allocated by governments, are distributed equally; and
4. The maintenance of minimum standards: certain basic rights are
protected, and no one is allowed to fall below a defined
minimum position in terms of matters such as income and access
to basic services.
6
The selection that one makes from this list will depend upon
one's views about the necessity of distributive justice and the emphasis
that one places on each of three objectives: equity, efficiency, and the
freedom of individuals. The widespread perception that there are
fundamental conflicts between equity on the one hand and efficiency
and individual freedom on the other may lead society to give less priority
to the achievement of a greater degree of redistribution.
Okun 7 and others have postulated the notion of a basic trade off
between efficiency and equity. Although the validity of this notion has
been questioned by others,8 mainstream economic opinion in recent
years has tended to favour options that emphasize the trade off.
Saunders points to the dominance in the 1980s of efficiency
considerations and of the view that these considerations require
free-market solutions.9 The prevalence of this view led to a neglect of
the positive role of public intervention. Furthermore, because the
emphasis on free-market solutions was based on a very narrow efficiency
perspective, it encouraged policies that were ultimately ineffectual as
well as inequitable. Still, as Saunders notes, "the ideology of freedom of
choice is a very powerful force in contemporary economics (West and
East) which the welfare state cannot afford to ignore."
10
The consequence of this state of affairs is an increasing emphasis
on the libertarian view in debates about the role of government. The
6 j. Le Grand, The Strategy of Equality: Redistribution and the Social Services (London: Allen
& Unwin, 1982); G. Mooney, "Equity in Health Care: Confronting the Confusion" (1983) 1:4
Effective Health Care.
7 A. Okun, Equality and Efficiency, The Big Tradeoff (Washington: Brooking Institution, 1975).
8 See, for example, R. Kuttner, The Economic Illusion: False Choices between Prosperity and
Social Justice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984).
9 P. Saunders, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Social Policies: An International Perspective
(Discussion Paper No. 28) (Kensington, N.S.W.: Social Policy Research Centre, University of New
South Wales, December 1990).
1 0 Ibid. at 27.
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proponents of this view favour the "minimum standards" definition of
equity, which they would apply narrowly and rather harshly. In the
libertarian view, the pursuit of equity should be limited to action that
will transfer purchasing power to the very poor. Any additional action to
redistribute resources would not be "equitable" or "just," since it would
impose an unacceptable constraint on freedom of choice; in addition, it
would diminish efficiency. Payment for government services, according
to this philosophy, should be related not to ability to pay but to benefits
received. This assertion has obvious implications for progressive
taxation, among other things.
Another perspective relevant to redistributive policy concerns
itself not only with inequalities between individuals or groups but also
with the unequal positions of individuals and families at different stages
in their lifecycles. This perspective can be translated into a desire to
redistribute resources from periods in the lifecycle of less vulnerability to
periods of greater vulnerability. The periods of greater vulnerability
include old age, periods of parental responsibility for dependent
children, and periods of illness or unemployment. This concern with
temporal inequalities is reflected in the adoption of income maintenance
objectives in the social security programmes of most OECD countries.
We take the view that the redistributive objective of public
intervention should in general be to promote equality of opportunity and
to recognize periods of vulnerability, particularly when these periods are
likely to be accompanied by insufficient income. We choose the
objective of equality of opportunity because it balances the demands of
equity, efficiency, and freedom of choice. It implies intervention to
reduce structural factors that promote inequalities but less intervention
than the equality-of-outcome objective implies. The pursuit of equality
of opportunity upholds-in fact, it seeks to enhance-freedom of choice.
This is not to say that in some specific areas of intervention equality of
outcomes for differing groups would not be a desirable result. Indeed,
to promote equality of opportunity generally, it is necessary to reduce
inequalities of outcome in areas such as education and health status,
given their importance to individuals in determining future potential and
opportunities, including potential to earn income. The minimum
standards approach to redistribution is too limited, since it does not
imply a commitment to deal with the structural reasons for substantial
inequalities.
There are at least four types of inequalities that public policy
must address in order to improve equality of opportunity:
1. Inequalities in income;
2. Inequalities in asset and wealth ownership;
[VOL 31 NO. 1
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3. Inequalities in labour market earnings potential; and
4. Inequalities in access to community resources.
A public policy approach to achieving equality of opportunity requires a
combination of social security, taxation, education, labour market,
health, and urban and housing policies. These policies should pursue the
following goals:
1. To ensure adequacy of income through tax and transfer
arrangements;
2. To help people to obtain secure, well-paid employment by
providing education and labour market programmes;
3. To ensure access to affordable housing; and
4. To improve living standards by ensuring access to services such
as health care, child care, and transport.11
A policy approach that adopts these goals addresses both the
necessity of improving the short-term position of vulnerable people
(through income support payments and services that improve immediate
living standards) and the necessity of reducing inequality and
vulnerability in the longer term by attacking labour market disadvantage.
Dealing with labour market disadvantage is important because
employment is the major source of personal income, and lack of
employment is the major cause of poverty.1 2 However, unless
employment growth is accompanied by policies to ensure that those with
labour market disadvantage obtain employment, its impact on poverty
may be limited.13
Within this broader public policy redistributive framework, the
objectives of social security and taxation policy should be:
1. To provide an adequate level of income (in Australia, this is
primarily the responsibility of the social security system);
2. To raise sufficient revenue to finance adequate levels of income
support and to finance the provision of services such as
education, labour market programmes, affordable housing,
health, and community amenities;
3. To raise revenue in such a way that economic efficiency is
11 B. Cass & A. McClelland, "Changing the Terms of the Welfare State: Redefining the
Purpose and Structure of the Australian Social Security" in P. Saunders & A Jamrozik, eds., Social
Policy in Australia: What Future the Welfare State (Reports and Proceedings No. 79) (Kensington,
N.S.W.: Social Welfare Research Centre, University of New South Wales, 1989) 55 at 69-70.
12 B. Bradbury, et al., Poverty and the Workforce (Reports and Proceedings No. 72)
(Kensington, N.S.W.: Social Welfare Research Centre, University of New South Wales, 1988).
13 p. Saunders, Employment Growth and Poverty: An Analysis of the Australian Erperience,
1983-1990 (Discussion Paper No. 25) (Kensington, N.S.W.: Social Welfare Research Centre,
University of New South Wales, September 1990).
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enhanced and employment opportunities are generated;
4. To provide assistance in such a manner that incentives to
undertake employment are maximized where appropriate; and
5. To ensure that the combined effect of the tax and social security
systems is to reduce rather than reinforce existing inequalities,
and, in particular, to target assistance to those in greatest need.
B. The Complementary Roles of Social Security and Taxation
As later parts of this paper show, neither the social security
system nor the tax system currently in place in Australia are designed to
effect the fundamental and comprehensive redistribution envisaged
above. The social security system falls short of its primary role of
ensuring that all people have an adequate income and are linked to
mainstream economic opportunities. The tax system does not generate
adequate revenue to fund a genuinely redistributive public expenditure
programme, and the assistance that it provides through tax concessions
often directly undermines the operation of direct expenditure
programmes. The tax system's mild progressivity, at best, fails to achieve
the objective of equitable collection of revenue for the social security
support systems. Nor does it operate in a way that enhances overall
economic well-being. Thus, both equity and efficiency are compromised.
The failure of the social security and tax systems to complement
each other and to achieve broader redistributive goals is at least partially
attributable to the lack of a consensus about what these goals should be.
There is also a lack of understanding of the major defects of the tax
system: community debate gives more attention to the alleged failure of
the social security system to benefit those most in need than it gives to
the fact that the tax system often operates to benefit those least in need.
III. AUSTRALIA'S TAX AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS:
REFORMS OF THE 1980s
Australia's current tax and social security systems embody a
number of changes introduced by the federal Labor government, which
has been in office since 1983.
In September 1985, after considerable community debate and a
"taxation summit," the Labor government announced a wide array of
changes in income and wholesale sales taxation. Significant income tax
and wholesale sales tax reforms were implemented between 1985 and
[VOL. 31 No. I
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1987. Further substantial changes have been made to the business tax
and superannuation (pensions and pension funds) taxation since 1987.
Social security reform has been guided primarily by the operation
of the Social Security Review, a comprehensive assessment of the social
security system commissioned by the government in 1986. The Review
followed the introduction in 1985 of an assets test designed to improve
the targeting of assistance provided through the pension scheme. The
test was later extended to other transfer payments. The changes in
social security programmes that resulted from the Review were
complemented by substantial changes in the procedures for enforcing
maintenance payments for sole-parent households.
The extent and direction of these tax and social security changes
has been affected by the broader economic, social, and political context.
The federal Labor government came to office in 1983 during a recession,
with unemployment levels of over 10 per cent. However, subsequently
unemployment increased substantially from 5.8 per cent to 11.1 per cent
between June 1989 and June 1992. A key feature of the Labor
government's platform was (and remains) an accord with the union
movement through the Australian Council of Trade Unions (AC'U).
Under the terms of the accord, the government could pursue an incomes
policy approach, designed to deliver income and employment growth. It
would also seek to restrain inflation, and at the same time, protect living
standards through an integrated approach to wage, tax, and social
expenditure policies.
The objective of increasing economic and employment growth
dominated the first few years of the Labor government. Pursuit of this
objective was also accompanied by financial deregulation. However, the
marked deterioration of Australia's foreign debt and current account
position in 1985-86 led to a new emphasis on structural change and
economic restraint. The government adopted a tightened
macroeconomic policy based on fiscal restraint and severe cuts in
government spending.
As Saunders notes,14 some of the broader policy outcomes since
1983 have been:
1. An increase of almost 1.5 million in employment from June 1983
to June 1989 and an associated (but not commensurate) decline
in unemployment;
15
1 4 Supra note 9 at 31.
15 See Saunders, supra note 13.
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2. A real decline of 4.8 per cent in average weekly earnings between
1982-83 and 1988-89; and
3. A reduction of the Federal budget deficit by more than 6 per
cent of GDP; thus a deficit of 4.1 per cent of GDP in 1983-84
became a surplus of 2.2 per cent of GDP in 1989-90. As a result of
the recession, the deficit has now returned to about 4 per cent of
GDP..
The emphasis on reducing the deficit through spending cuts
coincided with the Review and limited the capacity of social security
reform to increase transfer payments.
A. Tax Reform
After decades of relatively minor tinkering and ad hoc
adjustments, the Australian tax system underwent its first and only major
restructuring in 1985. The reforms were prompted by a widely perceived
need for significant changes in the structure and functioning of the
system-a need that had been demonstrated in the 1970s by the findings
of the Asprey16 and Mathews 17 reports. It was also increasingly clear
that the personal income tax system had been severely undermined
during the late 1970s and early 1980s by widespread tax avoidance
practices-practices that had often been judicially sanctioned by the
High Court.
1. Features of the pre-reform system
Before the 1985 reforms, Australia's tax system exhibited the
following features:
1. A relatively vety low level of taxation as a proportion of GDP. In
1983, taxation in Australia amounted to 29 per cent of GDP and
the OECD average was 36 per cent; only three OECD countries had
lower levels of taxation-.18 However, one of the principles of tax
16 Australia, Taxation Review Committee Final Report (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1975) (Chair: K. Asprey) [hereinafter Asprey Report].
17 Australia, Committee of Inquiry into Inflation and Taxation Final Report (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975) (Chair: R. Mathews).
18 OECD, Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-89 (Paris: OECD, 1990) at 71.
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reform articulated by the Prime Minister was that reforms should
not increase taxes relative to GDP.19
2. The predominance of income taxes as a proportion of total tax
revenues. In 1982, only three comparable OECD countries
surpassed Australia in their reliance on income taxation.
Concerns about the incentives for tax avoidance created by such
a high level of reliance led to pressure for a change in the tax mix
away from income taxation and toward indirect taxation. Many
observers failed to realize that Australia relied on its income tax
to collect revenue that other countries collected through specific
social security levies that were comparable to income taxes. In
1982, Australia's income tax revenue plus social security
contributions and payroll taxes amounted to 15.6 per cent of GDP,
whereas the OECD average was 21.3 per cent 20 Indeed, indirect
taxation raised 31.7 per cent of total tax revenue in Australia,
whereas the OECD average was only 29 per cent.21
3. A narrow tax base for both income and indirect taxation. The
perception before reform was that the narrow income and
indirect tax bases were inefficient, distortionary, and
inequitable.22 The major deficiencies of the income tax base
included the absence of an effective tax on capital gains, the
non-taxation of imputed rent, and the effective non-taxation of
most employment-related fringe benefits. Taxable income was
further reduced by a number of concessions, notably
superannuation tax concessions; by tax minimization practices,
such as the use of income-splitting and tax-favourable company
structures; and by the underdeclaration of income from a wide
range of non-employment sources. In the case of indirect
taxation, the narrowness of the base arose from the non-taxation
of services and a wide range of exemptions from the wholesale
sales tax, of which the most significant were food and clothing.
Furthermore, the existence alongside the wholesale sales tax of a
number of excise taxes meant that in many cases different tax
rates applied to different but similar goods, an arrangement that
19 Australia, Reform of the Australian Tax System (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1985) at 2 [hereinafter Draft White Paper].
20 J. Kesselman, "Role of the Tax Mix in Tax Reform" in J. Head, ed., Changing the Tax Mix
(Sydney- Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1986) 49 at 54 and at 59.
21 OECD, Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-82 (Paris: OECD, 1983) at 7.
These figures treat the crude oil levy as an indirect tax rather than as a tax on profits.
2 2 D. Morgan, "An Agenda for Tax Reform" in Head, ed., supra note 20, 1 at 14.
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was seen to be arbitrary and distorting and to reduce the capacity
to raise additional revenue from indirect taxation. Proposals for
the introduction of a broad-based consumption tax (BBcr) at a
single rate with no exemptions arose in response to these
perceived problems, as well as from the desire to generate
sufficient revenue to substantially lessen reliance on income
taxes.
4. An absence of indexation of the income thresholds applicable to the
marginal tax rates used to calculate income tax liability. The
absence of rate indexation, along with inflation and a narrow
base, had produced a state of affairs in which high marginal tax
rates applied at relatively low levels of income. When the Labor
government came to power, households with average weekly
earnings were likely to become subject in the near future to the
40 per cent marginal rate. There was considerable pressure to
reduce this rate and also to reduce the top rate (60 per cent),
which applied to incomes over $35,000. A related problem was
the high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) faced by many social
security recipients as a result of the interaction of the tightly
income-tested social security system and the income tax system.
Pensioners and beneficiaries, who had little or no private
income, found themselves liable for income taxes. Most
pensions and benefits were taxable, and the EMTRs on private
income that many pensioners and beneficiaries faced ranged
from 60 per cent to over 100 per cent. Such rates were termed
"poverty traps" because of their possible work disincentive
effects on people whose incomes left them on or below the
poverty line.P
6. An absence of wealth taxes or death duties. Death duties,
previously levied at the state government level, had been
progressively wound down since the late 1970s and by 1983 were
non-existent. Furthermore, Australia did not have any general
wealth taxation and was among the few OECD countries that had
neither a wealth tax nor death duties. This situation prompted
the following comment by a visiting American researcher:
23 A. Whiteford & P. Whiteford, "Equity, Tax Reform and Redistribution" (June 1985) Social
Security J. 1 at 6.
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'The point was made again and again that, with abolition [of death duties], Australia
would stand unique in the industrialized western world as a country without any taxes on
capital, neither income tax on capital gains nor annual wealth tax nor death tax. ... In its
abolition of death and gift duties Australia has set out on alonely traiL2 4
2. The tax reform package
In late 1984, the Prime Minister went to the polls promising a
consensus approach to tax reform. His government was re-elected, and
early in 1985 he announced that a "tax summit" would be held later in
the year. In preparation for the summit, the Treasury prepared a Draft
White Paper,25 which was released shortly before the June summit. The
government's hopes for abroad consensus for income tax rate cuts and a
shift toward greater reliance on consumption tax in return for a broader
income tax base were dashed when the business community split on the
proposed shift and the union movement rejected it.
In September, the Treasurer announced a package of
comprehensive reforms. First, there were a number of income tax
base-broadening measures, including:
1. A capital gains tax to apply, at ordinary marginal tax rates to
real gains (rather than nominal gains) realized on assets
purchased after 19 September 1985 (an owner-occupied
principal residence was exempt from the tax);
2. The taxation of non-cash fringe benefits at the employer level
and the imposition of severe restrictions on the deductibility
of business entertainment expenses; and
3. The reduction of some of the tax benefits available through
negative gearing related to property acquisition (this
provision was subsequently revoked).
Other income tax changes included the introduction of a foreign
tax credit system (it was changed in 1988, with effect from 1990, to a
partial credit and partial exemption system), the removal of the double
taxation of dividends through the introduction of full imputation, and an
increase in the company tax rate from 46 per cent to 49 per cent. This
increase made the company tax rate equal to the new top marginal tax
rate for the personal income tax.
The second set of changes consisted of income tax cuts, which
were delivered primarily through a reduction in rates rather than an
2 4 W. Pedrick, "Oh! To Die Down Under! Abolition of Death Duties in Australia" (1982) 14
U.W.A. L. Rev. 438 at 443.
25 Supra note 19.
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increase in the income thresholds at which the rates applied. The rate
changes, which included a reduction in the top marginal tax rate from 60
per cent to 49 per cent, benefited high income taxpayers most. There
have since been additional tax cuts, negotiated with the ACU on the basis
of the accord, as part of two packages involving a trade off between wage
increases and personal income tax cuts.2 6 Like the first tax cuts, these
cuts have tended to reduce rates rather than increase thresholds. The
result, as Table 1 shows, has been a trend toward a less progressive rate
scale. Further cuts in marginal rates, not shown in Table 1, will come
into effect in 1994-95 and 1995-96.
TABLE 1
Tax Rate Scales Applying in 1983 and 1993
1983 1993
Income Tax Rate Income Tax Rate
$0-4,595 0% $0-5400 0%
4,596-19,500 30% 5,401-20,700 20%
19,501-35,788 46% 20,701-36,000 38%
35,789+ 60% 36,001-50,000 46%
50,000+ 47%
The 1985 changes also included some measures to reduce the
poverty traps that faced social security recipients by increasing the
threshold of private income at which the income test applied for
pensioners, with higher increases for pensioners with children, and by
eliminating the separate income test for recipients of rent assistance.
The final set of changes entailed some rationalization of
wholesale sales tax rates, and a slight broadening of the base, but they
fell well short of the single rate and the expanded indirect tax base
envisaged by the BBCT. The rate structure was rationalized into a
three-rate system-10, 20, and 30 per cent. More substantial and later
changes have effectively broadened the wholesale sales tax base and
increased sales tax revenue as a proportion of GDP from 1.5 per cent in
26 One of the packages also involved agreement by the ACTU to forgo some wage claims in
return for a compulsory employer superannuation contribution equal to 3 per cent of wages.
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1980-81 to 2.7 per cent in 1989-907 The figures exaggerate the effect of
the change, since some of the base broadening was accompanied by the
elimination of excise taxes on items now covered by sales tax. The
changes included the extension of sales taxation to beer, to a range of
federal government commercial enterprises such as Telecom (the
national telephone company) and Australia Post, as well as discretionary
rate changes for a number of goods.
Business taxation, apart from the introduction of imputation, the
increase in the company tax rate, and some changes in the tax treatment
of trusts, was left substantially unchanged until May 1988. Then the
government announced a drop in the company tax rate from 49 per cent
to 39 per cent, a broadening of the base through the removal or
reduction of a number of tax concessions, in particular the accelerated
depreciation system, the non-taxation of income from gold mining, and
the tax concessions available to life offices and friendly societies. The
government also announced certain changes in the taxation of
superannuation that we shall describe later.
In early 1992 changes to the personal rate scale were announced.
The changes, to be phased in over the 1994-95 and 1995-96 tax years,
lower the rates applicable to intermediate brackets. At the same time, a
modified form of accelerated depreciation was reintroduced and an
investment allowance was adopted for large investments. Finally, in
early 1993, the government proposed a reduction of the company tax
rate from 39 per cent to 33 per cent as part of its election platform. (The
opposition Liberal/National coalition proposed an increase in the
company tax rate to 46 per cent.) Shortly after its re-election, the Labor
government introduced legislation to give effect to the rate reduction.
B. Social Security Reform
Australia, like most comparable countries, has a categorical
system of income support. Entitlement for payment is based on old age,
disability or sickness, unemployment, or the undertaking of caring
responsibilities, such as the sole care of a dependent child or the care of
a sick relative. Australia is distinctive, however, in that entitlement
under its system is strictly means-tested (through an income and assets
test) and financed through general revenue. It does not have social
insurance-based payment nor universal (in the sense of non-means-
tested) payments.
2 7 Australia, Budget Statements 1990-91 (Budget Paper No. 1) by Hon. P. Keating, Treasurer
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990) at 4.37.
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1. Factors that prompted social security reform
The 1986 Social Security Review was the consequence of a
recognition that the existing social security system, a product of the years
immediately after the Second World War, needed to be brought up-to-
date. It was necessary to address a variety of social and economic
changes that had occurred since the system had assumed its present
form. The first background paper of the Social Security Review28
documented these changes, which included the following:
1. Substantial increases in the rate and duration of unemployment and
a change in the composition of unemployment. While the
unemployment rate had declined from over 10 per cent in 1983,
it was still almost 8 per cent in 1985, when more than 35 per cent
of unemployment beneficiaries had been in receipt of benefits
for more than one year.
2. An increase in the number of one-parent families from 9 per cent of
all households with children in the mid-1970s to over 14 per cent in
1983. Almost 90 per cent of these families were headed by
women. Because of the high level of unemployment, the
significant labour market disadvantage of one-parent
households, and the low level of maintenance paid to them by
non-custodial parents, a high proportion (87 per cent) of these
households relied on a pension or similar benefit.
3. An increase in poverty, particularly in child poverty. Between
1972-73 and 1981-82, the proportion of people in poverty
increased from 8 to 13 per cent. Child poverty increased from 8
to 19 per cent. By 1981-82, the poverty rate for female-headed
one-parent families was 50 per cent, the rate for married couples
with three or more children was 19 per cent, and the rate for
families with four or more children was 33 per cent.
4. The ageing of the population, putting increased pressure on the aged
pension. There was no consistent understanding of the
respective roles of the aged pension and occupational
superannuation in providing adequate retirement incomes, and
the two systems conflicted in many ways. The Acru, through the
accord, had promoted the growth of occupational
superannuation. Nevertheless, the coverage provided by
occupational superannuation was relatively low and inequitable.
28 Social Security Review, The Case for Review of Aspects of the Australian Social Security
System (Discussion Paper No. 1) by B. Cass (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service,
1986).
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There were at least two other contexts in which the tax-transfer
system failed to provide adequate income support. First, a large number
of social security recipients had incomes below the poverty line. Second,
the assistance provided to households with children was low relative to
the assistance provided to households without children. Both the
supplementary income-tested payment to pensioners, beneficiaries, and
low wage earners with children, and the Family Allowance, which had
been paid since 1976 to all families with children, were insufficient to
eliminate this relative disadvantage.
The Review presented evidence that in Australia the level of
support for families with children was low relative to the level in most
other OECD countries, 29 and evidence from other sources indicates that
Australia's relative level of income support for low income families with
children was especially low. An international comparative study showed
that in 1981-82 the proportion of children below the poverty line after
the operation of the tax-transfer system was much higher in Australia
than in many other countries3 0
The level of income support payments had increased
substantially in real terms in the early 1970s. However, even though the
real pension rate rose slightly between 1976 and 1983, there were real
declines in payments for the unemployed and in the supplements paid to
pensioners and beneficiaries who had dependent children or who rented
privately.31 In addition, family allowance failed to keep up with price
increases and declined by almost 30 per cent in real terms between 1976
to 1986.
The Review also brought out concerns about the operation of
the income test for pensioners and beneficiaries and the work
disincentives created by the income-test arrangements, particularly for
unemployed people, the spouses of unemployed people, and sole
parents. As the Review progressed, these concerns broadened into a
concern about the lack of active measures to assist the entry or re-entry
of jobless recipients into the labour market and the lack of integration
2 9 Social Security Review, Income Support for Families with Children (Issues Paper No. 1) by B.
Cass (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986).
30 P. Saunders & P. Whiteford, Ending Child Poverty: An Assessment of the Government's
Family Package (Reports and Proceedings No. 69) (Kensington, N.S.W.: Social Welfare Research
Centre, 1987).
31 P. Saunders, B. Bradbury & P. Whiteford, "Assessing Social Security Developments and
Reform Proposals" (Paper presented to the Conference on Australian Economic Policy, Centre for
Economic Policy Research, Canberra, 27-28 November 1989) at 128 [unpublished].
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between the social security system and labour market programmes.3 2
Finally, there were also concerns about the lack of integration
between the tax and income security systems. The income unit for social
security purposes was the family; the income unit for most tax purposes
was the individual. The two systems used different definitions of
income-the definition for social security purposes was broader-and
different time periods in assessing income. The administrative
complexities of the two systems created confusion for people who had to
deal with both of them.
Various schemes for integrating the two systems had been put
forward. One, arising from the Henderson poverty inquiry,33 was a
guaranteed minimum income scheme that abolished the separate social
security means test and the categorization of payments, and made all
transfer payments taxable (at relatively high but constant rates).
Another scheme exempted pensioners from taxation and changed the
operation of the pension income test.34
2. The Review's recommendations and subsequent policy changes
The Social Security Review initially defined three areas of social
security policy to review: (1) income support for families with children;
(2) assistance to people of workforce age; and (3) retirement income
policy. It later added the area of disability income support policy.
Throughout the period of its operation, from 1986 to 1989, the
Review made detailed policy recommendations. The Review's approach
was to accept the continuation of a categorical income-tested system but
32 Social Security Review, Income Support for the Unemployed in Australia: Towards a More
Active S stem (Issues Paper No. 4) by B. Cass (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing
Service, 1988).
33 Australia, Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Poverty in Australia, vol. 1 (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975) (Chair: R.F. Henderson). Commonly known as
the "Henderson poverty inquiry," this study was commissioned in 1972 and completed in 1975. It
assessed the number of people in poverty in Australia by using a measurement now referred to as
the "Henderson poverty line." The threshold was based on a poverty line originally developed in
1966 by Henderson. It was set at the level of the basic wage plus child endowment (a non-means-
tested family support payment, which in 1986 was incorporated into Family Allowance), for a
single-income couple with two children. It was then varied for different family types by using
equivalent scales based on 1954 United States family budget data. Initially updated in conjunction
with movements in the average wage, in recent years it has been revised in line with changes in per
capita household disposable income.
34 D. Dixon & C. Foster, An Alteniative Patl to Integration of Social Security and Personal
Income TaxArrangements (Occasional Paper No. 1) (Sydney. Australian Tax Research Foundation,
1983). See also Saunders, supra note 9.
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to make recommendations that aimed broadly at improving adequacy; to
assist labour market integration; to reduce some of the overlap between
social security and income tax; to improve private provision in some
instances; and to reduce some elements of discrimination.
The government subsequently implemented some of the
Review's recommendations. First, it substantially increased some types
of payments. The most significant change was the introduction in 1987
of the Family Allowance Supplement (FAs), which was to be paid on an
income-tested basis to lower wage families at the same rate as the
additional pension-benefit payment for pensioners and beneficiaries
with children. It replaced the Family Income Supplement for low wage
families, which had been subject to stricter income tests and had had a
very low take-up rate.35 The FAS scheme was part of a package intended
to redeem the Prime Minister's pledge in 1987 that "by 1990 no
Australian child will be living in poverty."'3 6 The government later
restructured and substantially increased the payments and established
payments for children over thirteen, which were higher than the
payments for younger children.
Table 2 shows the real changes in social security and related
payments between 1982-83 (when the current Labor government was
first elected) and 1989-907 As the table demonstrates, there were large
real increases during the period in child-related payments to low income
families; payments for young children increased by about 45 per cent
and payments for older children by well over 100 per cent. Rent
assistance for low income families in private rental accommodation also
increased substantially in real terms, by between 49 and 64 per cent,
depending on the number of children in the family.
35 A substantial increase in take up of FAS between December 1987 and June 1988, was
probably attributable to the FAS publicity campaign. See Department of Social Security, The Family
Allowance Supplement Evaluation Report (Canberra: Department of Social Security, 1990).
36 RJ. Hawke, Prime Minister, "Opening of Australian Labor Party Election Campaign" (July
1987) 12:24 Commonwealth Record 1021 at 1023.
37 The data in Table 2 derive from B. Bradbury, J. Doyle & P. Whiteford, Trends in the
Disposable Income of Australian Families 1982-83 to 1989-90 (Sydney: Social Policy Research
Centre, 1990) [Revised version of a paper given to the Australian Institute of Family Studies, Third
Australian Family Research Conference, Ballarat, 27 November 1990] at 18.
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TABLE 2
Real Changes (Per Cent) in Social Security
and Related Payments, 1982-83 to 1989-90
Type of Payment CPI CPI(exyHM) a
Married Rate of Pension and Benefits +5.8 +3.9
Standard Rate of Pension +5.8 +3.9
Single Unemployment Benefit
16-17 Years -11.9 -13,5
18-10 Years -1.5 -3.2
Single Sickness Benefit
16-17 Years -12.0 -13.5
18-22 Years -19.5 -20.9
Additional Pension/Benefits for Children
Less than 13 Years +47.3 +44.7
13-15 Years +112.4 +108.6
Mothers/Guardians Allowance
One Child Under Six Years +6.5 -8.2
Rent Assistance
No Children +18.7 +16.6
With Children b +51.5 +48.8
+66.7 +63.7
Family Allowances
One Child + 17.9 + 15.8
Two Children -1.0 -2.7
Secondary Assistance Scheme +81.0 +77.8
Tertiary Education Assistance + 17.1 + 15.1
Notes: (a) CPI(ex.Hmi) is the Consumer Price Index net of health and
medical costs. This discounts for the fall in the cpI that was
caused by the introduction of Medicare in 1984.
(b) The range given reflects the further increases in rates or rent
assistance for those with three or more children.
Source: B. Bradbury, J. Doyle & P. Whiteford, Trends in the Disposable
Income of Australian Families, 1982-83 to 1989-90 (Sydney:
Social Policy Research Centre, 1990) at 18, Table 4.
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The government increased and restructured the family allowance
in 1989 in the context of a "living standards package," which included a
package of wage increases, tax cuts, and selective increases in transfer
payments. However, the increases in family allowance were not
sufficient to overcome a real decline over the period 1982-83 to 1989-90
for families with more than one child. In addition, an income test was
applied to family allowance in 1986, although at a relatively high income
threshold.
Two further changes of long-term significance in income support
for families with children deserve mention. The first was the indexation
to price movements of a number of supplementary payments, such as
rent assistance and the additional child-related payments0 8 The second
was the introduction of a more effective system for the calculation of
liabilities for maintenance and the collection of maintenance payments
from non-custodial parents. This new child support scheme has the
potential to improve substantially the financial circumstances of many
sole parent families, one of the most financially disadvantaged family
types in Australia 3 9
Changes in assistance levels for older people, particularly aged
pensioners, have been less marked. The government has increased the
basic pension rates somewhat, reduced the lag between price changes
and pension increases, and introduced annual indexation of the pension
income-test threshold. It has also made a commitment that by 1995 it
will not subject aged pensioners to taxation; in the interim, it promised
to increase the level of private income at which tax liability commences.
More recently, budget deficit pressures have caused the government to
withdraw the commitment. The most substantial gains have been made
by aged pensioners in private rental accommodation (the group of older
people most vulnerable to poverty), who have benefitted from the
increase in the rent assistance described above.
Some groups have missed out or have been made relatively
worse off. Payments to younger unemployed people and sickness
beneficiaries have been reduced in some instances. Payments to certain
38 Price movements are measured quarterly by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and
published as an index, the Consumer Price Index. The Index comprises both national changes in
prices and regional variations. For example, changes are estimated for the capital cities in addition
to the country as a whole.
3 9 Saunders, supra note 9. To date, however, the gains to the income levels of sole parents
resulting from the operation of the new child-support system have been limited. Even in the longer
term, many one-parent households will not benefit. Some households will not qualify for the
scheme (owing to its non-retroactive operation); in other cases, the non-custodial parent will not be
able to make even modest maintenance payments.
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other groups have been reduced or removed by changes that limit
eligibility or make it subject to review. The groups in this category
include older sole parents whose youngest child is over sixteen (a
reduction in eligibility), unemployed and sole parents (who have become
subject to special reviews to assess eligibility), and some pensioners with
financial assets (owing to changes in the definition of income for the
purposes of the income tests). 40 There has also been a selective
extension of waiting periods for unemployment benefits.
Finally, the government has introduced a variety of measures
designed to assist workforce re-entry by unemployed people, sole
parents, and people with disabilities. These measures have included
some selective easing of income tests, particularly for unemployed
people. In addition, there are provisions that allow the retention of
some benefits and assistance over the period of workforce re-entry, and
a package of assistance that priorizes entry into labour-market
programmes. For example, a programme called Jobs, Education and
Training (J=r), introduced in 1989 and aimed at sole-parent pensioners,
provides education, training, and child-care assistance to sole parents.
IV. REDISTRIBUTION OBJECTIVES AND THE CURRENT TAX
AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS
This part evaluates the current performance of Australia's social
security and taxation systems in light of the redistributive objectives
outlined earlier: (1) to raise sufficient revenue to fund relevant
expenditure programmes, including income support; (2) to provide an
adequate level of income support; (3) to enhance incentives and
opportunities for employment; and (4) to be equitable in terms of the
combined impact of social security and taxation.
The tax and social security systems still fail in many respects to
achieve even the minimum goal of redistribution-the provision of
adequate support for the maintenance of basic living standards-let
alone the broader redistributive goals advocated in Part II.
40 Social SecurilyAct 1991, ss. 1073, 1074, and 1099. Some capital investments were subject to
deemed rate of return rules in 1988 and in early 1991 a deemed rate of return was extended to bank
deposits containing more than $2,000.
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A. Revenue
In the latter half of the 1980s, the Australian government
directed its tax and expenditure programmes to the achievement of three
macroeconomic objectives. The first objective was to restrain wage
demands. To this end, in the context of the accord, the government
negotiated a number of "wage-tax" trade offs with the union movement.
In each case, organized labour agreed to forgo higher wage claims in
return for targeted tax reductions that delivered some after-tax gains.
As noted earlier, for the most part, the tax reductions merely offset the
effects of bracket creep. 41 The lost revenue could have been used to
fund increased transfer payments to recipients whose costs of living had
increased in a complementary fashion.42 The second objective was a
reduction in the federal deficit as a way of controlling a spiralling current
account deficit and an equally dizzying rise in interest rates. The third
objective was to move resources from the public sector to the private
sector in what proved to be a terribly misguided and unsuccessful
attempt to improve economic efficiency.
Both the wage-tax trade off and the deficit reduction programme
were funded by expenditure cuts. In the six years from 1983-84 to
1989-90, the government moved from a budget deficit of almost eight
billion dollars and to a surplus of just over eight billion dollars, a shift of
6 per cent of GDP. Although taxes as a percentage of GDP remained
relatively stable over the period, federal outlays as a percentage of GDP
declined from 29.6 per cent to 23.6 per cent. To the extent that other
expenditure cuts resulted in declining investment in the nation's social
infrastructure and physical capital, the government's broader wealth
generation and redistribution objectives were significantly undermined 3
It is highly questionable whether the federal government really
had to neglect direct-income support programmes or general public
41 See above, Table I at 76, and see text accompanying note 26.
42 Organized labour did not seek only to maintain after-tax remuneration in the trade-off
arrangements. For example, the 1989 negotiations led to the adoption of a "living standards
package" that contained some increases in transfer payments, including family allowance and IAs
(see text above at 82 following note 37, supra). The wage-tax trade offs also included support for
the extension of occupational superannuation through the introduction of a compulsory 3 per cent
employer contribution to superannution.
43 J. Disney, Jnfrastnicture and the Community (Sydney: Australian Council of Social Service,
1990) at 7-11. Disney notes that public sector investment is now at a lower level than it has been for
forty years. The decline in public investment has been especially severe at the state and local
government level. Over the past five years investment by these governments, which are responsible
for over three-quarters of all public infrastructure in Australia declined by 20 per cent.
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sector investment in order to fund the wage-tax trade off and the deficit
reduction programme. The alternative to expenditure reduction is, of
course, increased revenue raising. Given the government's wage-tax
trade-off strategy, direct increases by means of rate alterations were not
a feasible option. The clear alternative was to maintain, or even
increase, revenues in real terms by broadening the tax base. Many
countries used the base-broadening approach in the late 1980s to fund
tax-rate cuts. In addition to its revenue-raising potential,
base-broadening can play a significant role in achieving the horizontal
and vertical equity objectives of income taxation. It can also improve the
neutrality of the tax system and thereby contribute to economic
efficiency.
Base-broadening to increase tax revenues was both feasible and
desirable. Australia was a lightly taxed country. In 1983, the nation's tax
revenue accounted for 29 per cent of GDP; the average for the OECD
countries was 36 per cent. By 1988, the Australian figure had risen
slightly, to 30.8 per cent, and the OECD average had risen substantially to
38.4 per cent. Australia, formerly the OECD country with the
fourth-lowest level of taxation, now had the third-lowest level.44
One reason for this performance is that the effects of the
government's rate-cutting measures overwhelmed the effects of its
base-broadening measures. The 1985 base-broadening initiatives, such
as the Fringe Benefits Tax (which raised $1.168 billion in 1989-90) and
the capital gains tax ($543 million)45 were more than offset by the
personal income tax cuts over the period and the 1988 reduction in the
company tax rate by ten percentage points (which was expected to cost
$1.5 billion annually).4 6 In addition, the introduction of imputation
probably lowered the tax levied on distributed company profits by
another $250 million annually.47
The base-broadening measures were, in any case, far from being
comprehensive, and, given this lack of comprehensiveness, implied much
more than a loss of potential revenue. For the most part, the new
measures simply redefined old concessions and omissions. The
"reforms" retained and, to some extent, even enhanced costly economic
4 4 
OECD, supra note 18.
45 Budget Statements 1990-91, supra note 27 at 4.21 and 4.24.
46 Australia, Economic Statement May 1988 by Hon. P. Keating, Treasurer (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988) at 69.
47 Australia, Reform of the Australian Taxation System by Hon. P. Keating, Treasurer
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985) at 71.
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distortions and biases toward inefficient investment (in terms of pre-tax
returns).
One serious shortcoming of the base-broadening changes was
the inadequacy of the capital gains tax adopted in 1985. The features of
the tax that have most seriously limited its capacity either to raise
revenue or promote efficiency are as follows:
1. The exemption of gains realized on assets acquired before 20
September, 1985. This exclusion eliminated all opportunity to
increase tax revenues substantially in the shorter term. It also
encouraged investors not to realize their gains from existing
investments and thus, has locked in a sizeable portion of the
nation's investment capital.
2. The indexation of realized gains. No other types of income are
indexed in Australia, so this preference maintains the bias
toward investment in assets that generate capital gains, which
the former capital gains exemption established. Potential
revenue losses from the preference can only increase over time.
3. The exemption of the family home. This exemption is a source
of both short- and long-term revenue losses. Moreover, it
compounds the cost of inefficient investment encouraged by the
non-taxation of imputed rent.
4. The lack of a deemed-realization-at-death provision. This
omission will become particularly significant in the long term.
The base-broadening changes also failed to deal with the absence
of matching rules for interest expenses and any resulting investment
income. The most serious problem arose in the context of interest
expenses incurred on loans used to acquire property primarily for the
purpose of generating capital gains. Before 1985, when capital gains
went untaxed, taxpayers could deduct interest expenses from other
income with no offsetting inclusions. Since 1985, taxpayers have been
able to deduct fully the nominal value of interest expenses when
payments are made, to defer recognition of the resulting capital gains
until realization, and then to include only the after-inflation component
in assessable income. The government's only attempt to address the
problem was its introduction in 1985 of a set of quarantining rules that
limited deductions for current interest on loans taken out for the
purpose of acquiring rental property. These measures were, however,
abandoned less than two years later when the government decided they
were a political liability in the short term.
Other income-tax leakages arise because of an absence of
provisions to control deductions for hobby and recreational properties.
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Finally, the government has directed no attention at all to the serious
problems associated with income splitting.
B. Income Support
We showed in Part III that since 1983 the government has
substantially increased income support payments to certain groups,
notably low-income families with children and low-income people in
private rental accommodation, and has, through indexation, ensured
that the improvement in payments will be maintained over time and will
be insulated from the effects of future price increases.
There have been other improvements as well. They include
small real increases in the basic pensions and benefits paid to adult
recipients and an increase in the adult unemployment benefit (which
started from a lower base) of 18 per cent in real terms between 1982-83
and 1989-90 (see Table 2). The increases in assistance to families "has
had a significant impact on the living standard of the poor ... excluding
farm families, the real income levels of the 10th percentile of two-parent
and sole-parent families with children are estimated to have increased by
12 and 15 per cent respectively."48
Despite these increases, the income support paid through the
social security system still fell short in most cases of the Henderson
poverty lines. 49 Table 3, below, shows the different Henderson poverty
lines for different groups and income support payments for these groups
in 1989-90. Apart from payments to aged persons, all of the payments
were below the poverty line and in some cases substantially below it.
The fact that the poverty line had risen much more quickly than the
Consumer Price Index (cPi) was partially responsible for this result.
Further research on the costs of maintaining children has confirmed
that, although the increases in child-related payments were substantial,
the payments still fell short in many cases of the levels required by the
Henderson poverty line and other equivalent scales5 0
4 8 Bradbury, Doyle & Whiteford, supra note 37 at 55.
49 Supra note 33.
50 The equivalent scales are based on research on the costs of maintaining children and are
determined by estimating the additional income required for people with children to reach the same
standard of living as people without children. See B. Bradbury, The Family Package and the Cost of
Children (Sydney: Social Welfare Research Centre, 1989) at 27-31.
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TABLE 3





Income Unit Type $per week $per week
Single person: aged under 25 b 102.20 135.90
aged 25 to 44 126.30 149.10
aged 45 to 60/65 c 126.30 148.20
aged 60/65 and over c 133.40 129A0
Couple, no children: head aged under 65 222.30 246.60
head aged 65 and over 222.30 195.70
Couples with: one child 255.40 308.60
two children 288.50 362.20
three children 321.60 411.20
four children 354.70 459.60
five children or more d 390.80 514.60
Sole parent with: one child 179.00 205.50
two children 212.00 264.00
three children 245.20 307.10
four children or more e 278.30 381.00
Notes: (a) The poverty lines shown are the sample mean for each income
unit type. All figures have been rounded to the nearest 10
cents. Children are assumed to be aged under 13 years in
calculating income support levels, which include family
allowances.
(b) Unemployment benefit payable to an adult aged 19.
(c) Aged 65 for males; aged 60 for females.
(d) Assumes five children.
(e) Assumes four children.
Saunders, supra note 13 at 31.Source:
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In some areas of social security assistance, including payments to
young people, there were no increases at all, despite evidence that the
existing payments fell short of the poverty line.
After 1984, severe cuts in government expenditure constrained
the ability of the social security system to increase income support
payments further. Between 1985 and 1989, government expenditure as a
proportion of GDP declined from 38.8 per cent to 33 per cent.5 1 Outlays
on social security and welfare declined as a proportion of GDP from 8.4
per cent in 1985 to 7.1 per cent in 1990.52 Spending cuts were the key
element in a policy of fiscal restraint invoked by the balance of payments
crisis in Australia. Other countries too were restraining their spending.
Among the OECD countries, average government expenditure as a
proportion of GDP also declined from 47.4 per cent in 1985 to 45.5 per
cent in 1989. In Australia, however, government spending relative to
GDP was already well below the OECD average, and during the late 1980s
it fell even further below that average. The decline was especially
marked in the case of expenditure on social security transfers. In
Australia, such expenditure declined as a proportion of GDP from 9.6 per
cent to 8.8 per cent between 1985 and 1988, whereas the average for the
OECD countries remained stable at 15.9 per cent of GMD. 5 3
What made it possible to increase the level of some transfer
payments, in spite of a decline in the proportion of national income
allocated to transfer payments generally, was a drop in the number of
transfer recipients. Between 1985 and 1990, the number of pensioners
and beneficiaries declined from 204 to 186.9 per thousand.5 4 This
decline was the result of four factors:
1. A decline in unemployment, and therefore, in the number of
people reliant on unemployment benefits;
2. Special reviews of the eligibility and entitlement of social security
recipients, particularly unemployment beneficiaries and
sole-parent pensioners;
3. An increased reliance on means tests, including those applicable
to age pensioners, to family assistance, and to young unemployed
people; and
51 Saunders, supra note 9 at 4.
52 Department of Social Security, Teti Year Statistical Summary 1980-1990 (Canberra:
Department of Social Security, Statistical Analysis Section, 1990) [hereinafter Ten Year Statlistical
Sumnary]. As noted, see text below at 95, following note 61, infra), the reduction in social security
outlays was partly the result of a reduction in unemployment.
53 Saunders, supra note 9 at 7.
54 Teti Year Statistical Sumnmary, supra note 52 at 38-39.
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4. A denial of any entitlement to support to people in certain
categories and a reduction in eligibility and entitlement for some
other social security recipients, including young people and sole
parents with older children. A related development was a
decline in payments for members of some significantly
disadvantaged groups, notably people aged twenty years or less
who have been unemployed, or sick, or who are disabled. This
development, together with the reductions in eligibility for
certain groups, has very serious implications for the adequacy of
income support in general.
C. Employment Opportunities and Incentives
Between 1983 and 1989, Australia experienced a remarkable
growth in employment. This growth was reflected, in part, in a reduction
of unemployment levels from over 10 per cent in 1983 to 5.8 per cent in
1989.
Employment growth has declined dramatically since 1989, when
Australia entered a recession largely brought on by a federal
government that hoped to curb its continuing large current-accounts
deficits by cooling off the economy. Since 1989, unemployment has
increased to over 10 per cent, and it continues to climb.
For our purposes, the remarkable growth and scarcely less
remarkable decline in employment opportunities over the past decade
raises two questions. First, what was the redistributive impact of the
employment growth that occurred between 1982-83 and 1988-89,
particularly on families in poverty? Or, to put the matter in a somewhat
different way, to what extent did employment growth further the
redistributive aims of government? The second question, closely related
to the first, is to what extent did deficiencies in the tax system contribute
to the economic difficulties-and the consequent decline in employment
growth-that Australia experienced after 1985-86? In particular, to
what extent were such deficiencies responsible for Australia's inability to
generate sufficient investment and structural change to improve its
international trading performance and balance of payments position?
Saunders55 demonstrates that the growth in employment
between 1983 and 1989 did not reduce poverty levels by as much as
might have been expected. He cites three reasons for this outcome:
1. Employment growth did not lead to a corresponding reduction in
55 Supra note 13.
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the rate of unemployment, since the labour force participation
rate also increased over the period5 6
2. Between 1983 and 1989, there was only a slight reduction in the
proportion of families without an employed member and almost
no decline in the proportion of married-couple households
without an employed member. Given how low pension and
benefit payments were in relation to the poverty line, the main
route out of poverty was to have at least one family member who
was employed. The main change during this period was a
substantial increase in the proportion of families in which two or
more members were employed. More than one-third of the 1.45
million extra jobs went to people in families in which another
member was already employed.
3. There was substantial growth in part-time employment-an
increase from 16 per cent of all employment in 1980 to 21 per
cent in 1989.57 Part-time employment, particularly in the context
of Australia's income-tested social security system, is not likely to
raise family incomes above the poverty line.
Thus, although the number of people employed grew by over 1.4 million
between 1983 and 1989, the number of people on unemployment
benefits declined by only 245,000.8
Why did families that depended on social security benefits fail to
gain proportionately from the employment growth of the 1980s? Two
possible explanations suggest themselves.
First, the operation of the income tests may have discouraged
people from taking up employment opportunities. There is no evidence
on the actual disincentive effects of income tests on pensioners and
beneficiaries. However, because the amount of private income that a
recipient could earn before payment was withdrawn-the so-called
income-test-free area-was relatively low, it is likely that the income
tests did discourage participation in the workforce, especially part-time
participation and especially part-time participation by sole parents and
the unemployed spouses of unemployed beneficiaries 5 9 Although the
government liberalized the income test for beneficiaries over the period,
56 Growth in the participation rate for married women was especially strong; the rate rose
from 42 per cent in August 1983 to 51 per cent in 1989. See Bradbury, Doyle & Whiteford, supra
note 37 at 13.
571bid at 12.
58 Ten Year Statistical Summary, supra note 52 at 23.
59 Bradbury, Doyle &Whiteford, supra note 37.
[VOL. 31 NO. 1
Social Security, Taxation, and Redistribution
it effectively tightened the test for pensioners, including sole-parent
pensioners, in real terms. In addition, the income test for beneficiary
couples with children was more stringent than the test for couples
without children. Nor did the amount of private income not subject to
income-testing increase with the number of children in the family. The
spouses of unemployment beneficiaries, particularly if they had children,
faced substantial barriers to workforce participation.
Second, the degree of labour market disadvantage experienced
by many pensioners and beneficiaries would have prohibited them from
competing successfully for new employment opportunities with new
workforce entrants. To overcome this disadvantage, labour market
programmes were required. However, federal government expenditure
on labour market programmes declined over the period, from just under
$1,200 per unemployed person in 1983-84 to well under $900 per person
in 1989-90.60 In addition, the nature of the programmes changed: the
government reduced expenditure on employment-experience
programmes by 90 per cent and increased expenditure on training
programmes, particularly short-term training programmes that may well
have been less relevant to the needs of many disadvantaged long-term
unemployed people. The government did introduce a special package of
measures, collectively called "Newstart," with the object of helping
long-term unemployed people obtain jobs or access to appropriate
labour market programmes. JET, a similar programme, was offered on a
voluntary basis to sole parents. These programmes were introduced
relatively late in the period, and it is still too soon to judge their success.
The tax system bears a heavy responsibility for the increase in
unemployment since 1989. As we mentioned in Part IV (B. Income
Support), the system makes no attempt to match the deduction for
interest with the assessment of capital gains. The arbitrage possibilities
presented by the interest deduction and capital gains assessment rules
bias investment away from the production goods necessary for the
development of a sustainable and competitive manufacturing and
industrial sector and toward speculative investment in property and
shares. The principal-residence exemption encourages consumptive
over-investment in owner-occupied housing, particularly at the expensive
end of the market. During the late 1980s, therefore, inefficient
investment encouraged by illogical tax rules reduced Australia's capacity
to generate activity in the traded goods sector of the economy or to
generate employment.
60 Australian Council of Social Service, "Federal Budget Priorities 1990/91" (Paper No. 35)
(Submission to the Federal Government, May 1990) (Surry Hills: ACOSS, 1990) at 29.
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The tax distortions also played an important role in exacerbating
Australia's current-account deficit, the government's response to which
eventually wiped out all employment gains of the previous seven years.
Each of the factors that led to the deficit-financial deregulation, the
dismantling of barriers to the transfer of funds into and out of Australia,
high rates of interest, and high levels of inflation-combined with the tax
bias to encourage excessive reliance on debt, including overseas debt, to
fund unproductive investment. At the same time, the nation's capacity
to finance its growing foreign debt charges diminished as both the export
and import-substitution manufacturing industries fell victim to declining
investment in private sector and public infrastructure.
Faced with an unsustainably high current-account deficit by the
end of the 1980s and unwilling to inhibit excessive consumption of
imported goods by raising tax or tariff rates, the government deliberately
induced an economic downturn, which by 1991 had developed into a
serious recession that threatened to produce record unemployment.
D. Equity and the Combined Impact of Social Security and Taxation
The Australian social security system has a redistributive
impact6 l that is not sufficiently reinforced by the operation of the tax
system. Whereas the social security system distributes income to those
most in need, the tax system does not always levy taxes on the basis of
ability to pay. Moreover, the assistance provided to specific groups
through the tax system does not reinforce the targeted approach to
assistance taken by the social security system.
On the face of it, the tax changes since 1983, by increasing
income tax revenue as a share of total federal tax revenue, should have
increased the progressivity of the federal tax system: income taxes
(personal and company) accounted for 60 per cent of federal tax
revenues in 1983-84; in 1989-90, they accounted for 68 per cent.62
But is the income tax, in fact, markedly progressive? In an
analysis of the changes in tax incidence in Australia between 1975-76
and 1984-85, Warren found that, at the beginning of the period, average
income tax rates rose consistently with income. Toward the end of the
period, however, middle-income groups increasingly bore the burden of
61 A. Harding, Who Benefits? The Australian Welfare State and Redistribution (Sydney: Social
Welfare Research Centre, 1984) at 101.
62 Australia, Budget Statements 1991-92 (Budget Paper No. 1) by Hon. J. Kerin, Treasurer
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991) at 4.52.
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income tax.63 Warren conceded that the actual incidence of the tax
would probably be even less progressive than the study showed because
the impact of tax avoidance and the receipt of non-taxable income such
as capital gains tend to increase with income. Both overseas and local
data support Warren's suggestion that the proportion of income derived
as capital gains increases with overall income, which means that, before
the introduction of the capital gains tax in 1985, the income tax system
ignored increasingly greater portions of income as a taxpayer's ability to
pay rose.64
Table 465 shows that the income tax rate changes introduced
since 1983-84 have, on the whole, reduced nominal average tax rates for
low- and high-income tax groups. The reductions have been substantial
for very high, single-income earners and for low-income taxpayers with
children (owing to the substantial increase in income-tested family
payments). Middle-income taxpayers have either had no reductions or
experienced slight increases. Thus, nominal rate changes have
continued the trend toward increasing the share of the total tax burden
borne by the middle-income groups.66
63 N. Warren, "Changes in Australian Tax Incidence Between 1975-76 and 1984-85" in J.
Head, ed., Australian Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect (Sydney: Australian Tax Research
Foundation, 1989) 445 at 460-61.
64 R. Krever & N. Brooks, A Capital Gains Tax for New Zealand (Wellington: Institute of
Policy Studies, 1990) at 45-50; S. Ross & P. Burgess, Income Tax:A CriticalAnalysis (Sydney: Law
Book Company, 1991) at 95.
65 Average weekly earnings [hereinafter AwE] is the term used to refer to the mean earnings of
Australian wage and salary earners. There are actually a number of different measurements of AwE.
The version frequently used as a benchmark for social security payments is average weekly ordinary
time earnings of adults in full-time employment.
66 The Australian Institute of Family Studies estimates that between 1983-84 and June 1991
the average tax rate for a person with one-half AWE will drop from 15.5 per cent to 13.5 per cent, the
rate for a person with average A-wE will drop from 22.8 per cent to 22.7 per cent, and the rate for a
person with four times AWE will drop from 47.5 per cent to 40.84 per cent. The various AWE
measurements are determined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on the basis of quarterly
surveys. See Australian Institute of Family Studies, Taxes, Families and the Labor Party 1990
(Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies, 1990) at 26. The figures were based on a
lowest marginal rate of 21 per cent. Accordingly, they do not reflect the drop in the lowest marginal
rate to 20 per cent, which took place in January 1991.
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TABLE 4
Average Tax Rates for Individuals and Families
1983 to 1984, 1989 to 1990, and June 1991
June June
Level of 1983-84 1989-90 1991 1983-84 1989-90 1991
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Although changes in marginal and average tax rates would seem
to imply a lessening of progressivity over the decade, these changes have
been offset in part by the base-broadening measures introduced since
1985. For example, of the $306 million in taxes levied on taxable capital
gains derived by individuals in 1989-90, 60 per cent was collected from
individuals with incomes over $50,000. Before 1985, most of these gains
would have been untaxed. 67 At the same time, however, deficiencies in
the base-broadening measures have ensured that most of the tax
minimization strategies pursued by high-income taxpayers, including
negative gearing, the conversion of income to capital gains, and income
splitting, remain fully viable. Moreover, other "reforms," such as the
introduction of imputation credits for dividend income, have directly
lowered the tax levied on some types of investment income. It is
high-income taxpayers, of course, who are most likely to own shares.
68
The case study on retirement income in the following section
describes the changes in superannuation tax concessions since the early
1980s and compares the distributional impact of providing assistance for
retirement incomes through tax concessions for superannuation with the
distributional impact of providing assistance through the social security
system, via the aged pension. The salient point is that although tax
concessions available for superannuation have been reduced somewhat
since 1983, these reductions have had a more severe impact on low- to
middle-income earners than on high-income earners. Meanwhile,
substantial tax concessions for superannuation continue to be available
to high-income groups. Furthermore, assistance to aged pensioners
through the social security system has became more closely targeted as a
result of the introduction of the assets test, the income test for people
over seventy, the effective reduction in the real value of the
income-test-free area, and changes to the definition of income for
income-test purposes.
Thus, there continue to be considerable inequities and
inconsistencies in the treatment of retirement incomes. Moreover,
although the government has introduced an assets test for social security
recipients, it has failed to introduce any form of wealth taxation or death
duties. This inconsistency between the social security system's treatment
of assets and the tax system's treatment of assets is reinforced by a
similar inconsistency in the two systems' treatment of income from
6 7 Keating, Supra note 27 at 4.21.
68 National Institute for Industry and Economic Research, "Paper One: A Detailed
Commentary on the Draft White Paper" (Paper prepared for the ACTU) (Melbourne: National
Institute for Industry and Economic Research, 1985).
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assets. The social security system has introduced definitions of income
from investments that are substantially more stringent than the
definitions for income tax purposes. For example, as we mentioned
earlier, the social security income-test rules now prescribe a deemed
minimum return on many investments. No similar provisions apply in
the income tax system.
Family assistance is provided mainly through the social security
system and, to a much lesser extent, through the income tax system. This
provision has been targeted in a reasonably consistent way. However,
this assertion is also subject to two caveats.
First, the income test for family allowance payments was
introduced in 1986, not long after the top marginal tax rate for income
earners had been significantly reduced. The test was first applied on a
tapered withdrawal basis: the payments diminished as total parental
income rose above $50,000. (The threshold was later indexed, and in
1990 the tapered test was replaced with a sudden-death test-100 per
cent withdrawal above the threshold.) Thus, high-income single
taxpayers without children benefitted from a tax cut at about the same
time as high-income taxpayers with children had their family allowance
payments reduced.
The second source of inconsistency is the dependent spouse
(income tax) rebate. The rebate has a two-tiered structure. One rebate
is available for taxpayers who support a spouse alone; it is withdrawn at
the rate of one dollar for every four dollars earned by the spouse over
$282. A second, higher rebate is available for taxpayers who support a
spouse and one or more children. The rebate does not increase with the
number of children. The rebate was indexed in 1988 but the $282
threshold was not.
The equity assumptions that underlie the dependent spouse
rebate have been questioned on many occasions. The principal
argument against its retention is that the presence of a dependent
spouse does not reduce economic well-being and capacity to pay tax.69
The rebate has nevertheless been retained, and its supporters defend it
as an additional support mechanism for families. Unlike the family
allowance, however, it has not been income tested. During the 1993
election campaign the Government announced plans to replace the
dependent spouse rebate for parents at home caring for children with a
Home Care Child Allowance of $60 per fortnight, paid directly to the
primary caregiver.
69 P. Apps & E. Savage, "The Tax Rate Structure" in Head, ed., supra note 20, 341 at 345.
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V. SOCIAL SECURITY AND TAXATION LAW REFORM: AN
AGENDA FOR REFORM
The years since the mid-1980s have seen some commendable
changes in Australia's social security and taxation systems, changes that
have improved the systems' redistributive capacity and potential. The
changes in social security have included improvements in income
support for many of the most disadvantaged; an increase in efforts to
assist workforce re-entry by long-term unemployed, including sole
parents and disabled people; and the introduction of the Child Support
Scheme. Tax reform, through the personal and company income tax
base-broadening changes, has increased the tax system's ability to
provide additional revenue on a more equitable and economically
responsible basis in the longer term.
Yet significant problems remain. Many social security payments,
especially those for sole parents and young people, are still inadequate.
Given that unemployment is now over 10 per cent, the social security
system faces the challenge of ensuring that there will not be, as there was
in the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, a substantial growth
in the cohort of long-term unemployed. Yet prospects for avoiding this
outcome are very bleak.
The tax system still embodies deficiencies that both undermine
its capacity to raise revenue equitably and severely reduce economic
efficiency. Many of these deficiencies also undermine the targeted
approach to assistance taken by the social security system. For example,
the lack of a tax on imputed rent and the exemption of the family home
from the capital gains tax are tax concessions that largely benefit wealthy
homeowners and that drive up the price of housing. Meanwhile,
low-income private renters continue to receive a relatively low level of
rent assistance, and this assistance is strictly targeted. Similarly,
higher-income earners continue to receive substantial tax concessions
for their retirement whereas the aged pension is subject to a tight
income test whose impact falls mostly on retired people with relatively
modest levels of private income.
In brief, the gamut of redistribution is still far too narrow.
Proposals for broadening that gamut must, however, take into account
the significant economic and social changes that have occurred in recent
years or are still occurring: changes in workforce participation patterns,
changes in family formation, changes in the structure of the labour
market, and the onset in Australia of a long period of serious economic
difficulties and restraints. Many of the reforms of the past nine years
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have been attempts to promote broader redistributive goals while
recognizing the claims of this new set of social and economic realities. If
not all of the reforms have been successful, at least the essential strategy
of reform has been correct. Therefore, the aim of further reform should
be to build upon the positive features of the changes achieved during the
1980s.70
We should retain the broad features of Australia's present social
security system, and further social security reforms should be consistent
with those features. The proposal that we retain the broad features of
Australia's income-tested categorical system of income support implies a
judgment that the alternatives of a guaranteed minimum income system
or a universal social insurance system would not be appropriate. The
advocates of the guaranteed minimum income or basic incomes
approach point to its perceived advantages of simplicity, uniformity, and
the promotion of an adequate income as a right inherent in citizenship.
These are major strengths, but another feature of the basic incomes
approach is a lack of attention to the need to link income-support
arrangements with the labour market, particularly for people of
workforce age. If workforce re-entry and mainstream participation is to
be a significant objective of social security reform, the basic incomes
approach has significant disadvantages. Furthermore, the community is
not likely to accept the cost of an individually based guaranteed-
minimum-income proposal.
Supporters of social insurance and/or non-income-tested
schemes point to the weakness inherent in income-tested schemes,
namely, that although they may be efficient in targeting assistance to
those in need, they may fail to obtain sufficient community support and
thus, attract insufficient resources to accomplish their aims. In addition,
universal systems reduce the danger of marginalization that can occur
under an income-tested system. However, following a period
characterized by increased unemployment, population ageing, and the
formation of one-parent families, the trend in those countries that have
universal social-insurance-based systems has been toward systems that
rely upon means-tested social assistance payments as well as social
insurance arrangements. As Cass and McClelland have noted:
In the period of fiscal restraint from 1980 to 1988 a number of oncD countries exercised
severe restraint in their insurance-based employment benefit schemes, holding down or
reducing real benefit levels and in some countries demanding a longer minimum
employment record. Fiscal restraint has also affected the real levels of payment under
70 See Cass & McClelland, supra note 11.
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social assistance schemes in a number of OECD countries, through the suspension of
indexation arrangements. 71
The strengths of Australia's social security system include a
strong focus on poverty alleviation and a high degree of target efficiency.
The challenge, therefore, is to build on these strengths while seeking to
achieve the alleged advantages of the basic incomes model-adequacy,
uniformity, and simplicity-and attract sufficient community support to
generate the needed resources. It is also imperative that changes in the
social security system are complemented by tax reform and an agenda to
reduce labour-market inequalities.
Two things must be done to avoid the danger of marginalizing
social security recipients. First, it must be ensured that the recipients'
labour-market links are retained and strengthened. Second, it must be
ensured that additional assistance, whether it is provided through the tax
system or whether it is employment-based, has broad coverage and is not
inequitable. It is critical that attention be given to the level of assistance
provided by the tax system or through workforce participation. The
solution to the danger of marginalization must be:
[To] link the interests of people outside the work force to those of low income working
people ... [V]hat is required is an integrated combination of policies which break down
the rigid dichotomies between work force participation and receipt of welfare and a much
firmer commitment that combinations of market incomes and social wage transfers will
become increasingly prevalent and accepted. 72
It is especially important that these policies deal with the labour force
circumstances and earning capacities of women, since a large proportion
of poor families are headed by women.
Further social security reform should proceed as follows. First,
the social security system should extend income support, where it is
needed, to people within the workforce. The Family Allowance
Supplement is an example of such support. Opportunities for part-work,
part-welfare combinations should be enhanced, particularly for people
for whom full-time work is unlikely to be a viable option (at least for a
time) including sole parents, long-term unemployed people, the wives of
unemployed men, older people, and people with disabilities. This goal
implies the need for a selective liberalization of social security
income-testing in order to enable members of these groups to retain or
improve their labour-market attachment and supplement their social
security income.
71 1Aid. at 6.
72 IbdU at 63.
1993]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Second, the social security system should increase its base-level
income-support payments and make them more equitable. To be
specific, it should introduce further targeted increases (particularly for
younger recipients and sole parents), establish a long-term benchmark
for adequacy (from 25 per cent to 30 per cent of average weekly
earnings), and ensure that all categories of recipients receive similar
levels of payment. In particular, it should eliminate the differentials
between the payments for pension recipients and beneficiary recipients.
Third, social security programmes such as JET and Newstart
should be retained and strengthened. These programmes seek to link
people on pensions and benefits to opportunities for labour-market
participation. By supporting and improving beneficiaries' capability to
compete for good jobs, the programmes reduce long-term vulnerability.
Programmes of this kind are most effective when participation is
voluntary.
The significance of labour-market programmes such as work
experience and training cannot be overstated in the context of a social
security strategy that is based on integration with the labour market.
The social security initiatives must be backed by programmes that help
people to find jobs and improve their workforce skills and by policies
that protect the position of disadvantaged people in the workforce.
Thus, it is essential that social security reform be accompanied by:
1. Further labour-market reforms to reduce unemployment and
improve the position of low wage workers;
2. The provision of adequate labour-market and education
programmes; and
3. The provision of community services, including child care,
transport, and housing, particularly in low-income areas.
The income tax system too requires reform. The goals of a
reformed income tax should be: (1) to provide sufficient revenue on a
continuing basis; (2) to complement the redistributive effects of social
security; and (3) to promote and enhance economic growth, particularly
employment-producing growth. The priorities for reform should be to
strengthen the income tax base-broadening changes introduced in 1985,
and especially, to reduce intertemporal distortions that promote
economic inefficiencies.
Many reforms are needed. To begin with, we recommend the
following changes in the capital gains tax:
1. Removal of the exemption for gains realized on the disposal of
assets acquired before September 20, 1985.
2. Removal of the exemption for gains realized on the disposal of a
principal residence. If this step proved to be politically
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impossible, the second-best remedy would be to replace the
present exemption with a universal, limited lifetime exemption
for a designated amount of capital gains derived from any assets.
Such an exemption would not reduce inequities between those
most likely to realize capital gains and those unlikely to do so. It
would, however, address the inequities that the present
exemption causes between urban and rural owners, inner-city
dwellers and suburban owners, and residents of different states.
It would also reduce the present bias toward investment in
principal residences rather than in capital-gains-generating assets
generally.
3. The treatment of testamentary transfers in the same manner as
other gratuitous transfers or transfers for value. That is, death
should be treated as a period of time when a taxpayer realizes
the value of accrued gains.
4. Steps to close some of the loopholes in the legislation. The
loopholes include the failure of the capital gains tax to catch
gains realized by debtors when debts are forgiven, gains realized
on the disposal of motor vehicles, and gains realized when
taxpayers are reimbursed for previously deducted expenses.
A second goal of reform should be to eliminate opportunities for
mismatching income and outgoings. The existence of these
opportunities has contributed to intertemporal inefficiencies and
encouraged reliance on debt funding. There are two separate elements
to the problem: (1) a lack of inflation adjustment for outgoings that is
complemented by full inflation adjustment for gains; and (2) a timing
difference between recognition of outgoings and resulting income.
The preferable solution to the first problem is, of course, the
elimination of inflation. So long as that goal remains unattainable, the
second-best solution is consistent treatment of inflation throughout the
income tax system. Unfortunately, a number of technical and
international constraints appear to preclude the adoption of a fully
inflation-adjusted income tax base.73 And, a partially indexed system, as
Vann and Dixon note, is worse than no indexation at all.74
Thus, inflation adjustment of capital gains alone is undeniably
73 See R. Krever, Some Comments on Consumption Taxation, Income Tax Indexation and
Restricting hiterest Deductions on Takeover-Related Debts (Paper presented to the Australian Tax
Research Foundation seminar on Inflation, Taxation and Savings, 1990) [unpublished]. For a
contrary view see R. Vann & D. Dixon, Measuring Income Under Inflation (Sydney: Australian Tax
Research Foundation, 1990).
74 Vann & Dixon, ibid. at 5.
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the best approach in the best income tax system. But in an income tax
system that uses nominal dollars for all other measurement purposes, an
inflation-adjusted capital gains tax would amount to a distorting
preference. The answer is to eliminate the preference by measuring all
income and outgoings in nominal dollars.
The timing problem too will require a second-best approach.
The best solution would be to measure both interest expenses and
accrued capital gains on an annual basis. This is not possible so long as
capital gains are assessed on a realization basis. An approximation of
the annual assessment system can be accomplished by treating gains and
outgoings consistently and requiring taxpayers to defer recognition of
outgoings when they defer recognition of the resulting gain.
Quarantining systems that limit current interest deductions to the
amount of realized investment income and capital gains are common in
other jurisdictions and, as experience in Australia has shown, pose few
technical problems. They do involve some political risk, but appropriate
trade offs and public education programmes would smooth their
implementation.
Our third proposal is that consideration be given to the
introduction of an alternative minimum tax. Reform of the income tax
base has narrowed the gap between the measurement of taxable income
and that of real world profits. Many preferences remain, however, along
with many opportunities for "legitimate" minimization of tax. There has
been much criticism of the use of tax expenditures to encourage specific
economic activities, from film making to resource exploitation to
research and development. The critics argue that direct expenditures
can achieve the objectives of tax expenditures in a far more efficient and
equitable manner, a conclusion with which we agree. Ideally, the tax
expenditures would be eliminated; so long as they remain, however,
there is a strong case for limiting the extent to which they can be
exploited to reduce taxable income. The introduction of an alternative
minimum tax whose rates were set as percentages of the ordinary rates
would be the easiest way to accomplish this end.
A fourth goal of reform should be the adoption of a new basis
for changes in income tax rates. Overall, the income tax rate cuts
introduced since 1985 have heavily favoured the highest brackets. The
increasing income tax liability of middle-income earners cannot be
sustained, especially since inflation has in recent years substantially
eroded the real values of income thresholds. Rate reductions of the sort
employed in Australia are, in fact, leading to a de facto flat-rate income
tax.
Attacks on progressivity have two serious consequences. First,
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they make the tax itself potentially less effective as a redistributive tool;
obviously a tax that extracts more from high-income taxpayers than from
low-income taxpayers is more redistributive than one that does not.
Second, the progressivity of the income-tax rate scale reinforces popular
perception of the tax's redistributive role and the legitimacy of
redistribution itself. This perception of legitimacy in turn supports
compliance objectives and reinforces support for redistributive
expenditure programmes funded from income tax revenues.
An obvious alternative to the use of rate reductions to
accomplish income-tax cuts is the upward adjustment of rate thresholds.
A preferable way of carrying out rate-band adjustment is indexation of
the thresholds. At present, neither major political party displays any
interest in personal tax indexation. It must be conceded, therefore, that
the supporters of rate indexation face major hurdles. The drawback of
threshold indexation is that it increases the gains from income splitting.
Threshold indexation should be considered, accordingly, in the context
of a reform programme that includes anti-splitting measures.
And hence our fifth proposal for reform, the adoption of
comprehensive anti-income-splitting measures. Judicial and legislative
endorsement of income-splitting arrangements has led to widespread tax
minimization by higher-bracket taxpayers who derive property income or
professional or business income. Judicial and legislative irresponsibility
has been matched by administrative complacency. The Tax Office has
failed to use effectively the few tools available to combat splitting, such
as the capital gains provisions. This broad official endorsement of
income splitting by higher-bracket taxpayers has seriously eroded the
progressivity of the income tax, disabling its equity and redistributive
objectives, and undermining support for the tax by those who are unable
to engage in similar avoidance schemes.
Our last *proposal for income tax reform is that the existing
regime of superannuation tax concessions be replaced by a credit-based
system. We describe this proposal in detail in Part VI.
Next in importance to the income tax system is the indirect tax
system. The replacement of the wholesale sales tax with a broad-based
consumption tax (BBCT) was a central element of the opposition
Liberal/National coalition's platform in the 1993 election, a platform
solidly rejected by the electorate. Although many of the presumed
benefits of a BBCr, such as an increased incentive to save, have been
exaggerated, the introduction of a BBCr in Australia is probably
inevitable in the longer term as Australia's rejection of the tax becomes
increasingly anomalous in an international context.
A BBCr would be more regressive than the income tax, and
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depending on its design features, might be more regressive than the
existing indirect and excise tax regimes. The distributional consequences
of a BBCr would depend, therefore, on whether it simply replaced the
existing federal wholesale sales tax and the excise taxes, or replaced both
these taxes and reduced the income tax burden somewhat. Either
outcome would require the introduction of a compensation package
appropriate to the resulting regressivity problem.
Another possibility in the context of possible changes in the
federal-state financial relationship is the use of a BBCr to replace some of
the more narrowly based state taxes and charges. Once again, various
compensation questions arise.
Finally, it is important to maintain support for the reintroduction
of death and gift duties or the introduction of a wealth tax, or both.
Unfortunately, neither of the major political parties appears to be
interested in tackling the political difficulties associated with these taxes,
despite the taxes' obvious redistributive strengths and the less obvious
efficiency reasons for their inclusion. However, the time is ripe for a
debate. The conspicuous squandering of assets by many prominent
wealthy business people in the late 1980s has provoked public concern,
and institutional support for wealth taxation has been expressed. 75
VI. A CASE STUDY: INCOME SECURITY FOR THE AGED
A. Retirement Income Security
The federal government uses both the social security system and
the tax system to provide income security assistance to the aged. The
social security system provides a means-tested aged pension to older
persons. The tax system provides subsidies in the form of low tax rates
for employment income invested in special retirement savings funds
(superannuation funds) and for investment income generated by those
savings. Further subsidies are available for benefits withdrawn from
superannuation funds, provided they are' received as lump sum
payments. Do these measures satisfy any of the definitions of
redistribution that we postulated earlier? The answer seems to be that
they do not satisfy even the most basic definition: the maintenance of a
minimum adequate income standard for all.
75 See, for example, Catholic Bishops of Australia, Commonwealth and Common Good. A
Statement on Wealth Distribution from the Catholic Bishops ofAustralia (Melbourne: Collins Dove,
1991).
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The provision of income security for the aged is one area in
which the social security and tax systems could complement each other
well. Together they could supplement current resources to ensure that
people are able to set aside sufficient savings to generate an adequate
retirement income. This is not the way in which the current tax and
social security systems work. Rather than encourage savings for
retirement, the means-tested aged pension encourages people to
consume currently most of the income they receive during their working
lives in order not to disqualify themselves from a pension entitlement.
Meanwhile, the tax subsidies for retirement savings provide assistance
inversely to a taxpayer's needs; subsidies are skewed to those with the
highest incomes and fade out as a taxpayer's ability to save decreases.
And, to the extent that a person has managed to save for retirement, the
tax system subsidizes immediate consumption following retirement by
setting low rates on lump-sum retirement benefits. Immediate
consumption ensures inadequate resources for the remaining retirement
years and immediate eligibility for the means-tested pension.
The phenomenon that arises from the perverse harmonization of
the tax and aged pension systems is colloquially known as double
dipping, though it would be more accurate to call it triple dipping. First,
taxpayers exploit the tax subsidies for retirement savings. Second, they
exploit the preferential rates for lump-sum benefits and consume those
benefits as quickly as possible. Finally, they exploit the availability of the
aged pension for persons who have consumed their retirement savings.
The costs of these inefficient programmes increase steadily as
Australia marches toward the twenty-first century as an ageing society.
Cognizant of the inevitable long-term costs, the government has moved
to reform both the pension and tax subsidy systems. The reforms have
not been harmonized, however. As the next section explains, the trend
in the aged pension area has been to target benefits by reliance on
means testing. This approach has the effect of further encouraging
retired persons to dissipate their assets in order to retain eligibility for
the pension. Recent changes have reduced the tax subsidies for
lump-sum retirement benefits that can be consumed quickly, but, as the
following section notes, these benefits continue to receive preferential
treatment. Changes have also slightly reduced the retirement savings
subsidies accorded to high-income taxpayers. Once again, however, the
subsidies remain biased in favour of those least in need.
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B. The Aged Pension System
The federal aged pension was introduced in 1909 fdllowing the
establishment of an Invalid and Old Age Pension Trust Fund, which
replaced separate state government schemes. The pension was paid at a
maximum rate of ten shillings per week, which, at that time, was about
18 per cent of AWE. The age of eligibility was initially sixty-five for both
sexes, but it was lowered to sixty for women in 1910.
The option of a contributory social insurance scheme was
canvassed before (and after) the introduction of the first federal aged
pension, but no action was taken on this front. The aged pension was
established as a means-tested payment. It had an income test with a
sudden death 100 per cent withdrawal above the threshold and a
property test, which operated in an equivalent fashion. In 1961, the two
tests were merged. In 1969, the combined means test became a tapered
test with a 50 per cent withdrawal rate for income over the threshold.
During the 1970s, there was bipartisan support for the removal of the
means test and the provision of the aged pension on a universal basis.
The means test was abolished in 1973 for those aged seventy-five or
more and in 1975 for those aged seventy or more. In 1976, the property
test was abolished for all pensioners, so all that remained was an income
test for persons under seventy.
The tightened economic situation of the late 1970s and the early
1980s led to a reversal of this brief flirtation with universality. The
universal component of the pension (the part that applied to persons
aged seventy or more) was frozen in 1978, and in 1983, it was once again
income tested, although the test was more generous than the one
applied to persons under seventy. In 1985, the asset test was
reintroduced, partly in response to double dipping by retirees who
received large lump-sum superannuation payments, benefitted from the
associated tax concessions, and then invested the capital in schemes that
avoided the impact of the income tests.
The aged pension is now paid to men aged sixty-five or more and
women aged sixty or more on a means-tested basis. It is subject to both
an income test and an assets test. The income test applies to single
persons with private income above $43 per week and to married couples
with combined incomes above $76 per week. Above these
levels-commonly referred to as the income-free thresholds-the level
of the pension is reduced at the rate of 50 cents per one dollar of private
income. The assets test exempts the family home and compulsorily
preserved superannuation. To compensate for this concession, non-
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homeowners are allowed a higher level of assets before the test is
applied. The basic pension rates are indexed to the cpr.
In June 1989, there were over 1.3 million aged pensioners.
Almost three-quarters of them were receiving the maximum pension,
and over two-thirds of them were homeowners. Outlays on the aged
pension in 1988-89 amounted to $7.4 billion, or 39 per cent of total
social security outlays. By May 1993 there were 1.5 million aged
pensioners, and aged pension outlays totalled $9.9 billion.
C. The Tax Expenditure Programme
Special tax treatment of retirement savings has been a feature of
Australian federal income tax law since its inception in 1915. The
original Australian income tax rules encouraged retirement savings by
providing a deferral of tax on investments in special savings vehicles
known as superannuation funds (after the English terminology). No tax
was payable on the original contributions or subsequent investment
earnings until benefits were distributed to a taxpayer by way of regular
pension payments following retirement. If benefits were withdrawn
from superannuation funds in lump-sum form, the deferral could be
converted to an outright tax exemption.
As could be expected, the combination of tax deferral for
investments realized as a pension and exemption for savings withdrawn
as a lump sum, made superannuation funds popular savings vehicles for
higher-income taxpayers. Their popularity fell with income levels, partly
because the value of the tax concessions fell with income and partly
because lower-income taxpayers were less able to negotiate tax-effective
remuneration packages.
1. Superannuation savings: the pre-1983 regulatory aspects
Originally, neither federal income tax legislation nor state
legislation defined the exact character of a "superannuation fund." The
common law (or, more accurately, equity law) considered such funds a
type of trust.7 6 Some state superannuation fund legislation was
76 See, for example, P. Szabo, C. Beeny & P. Trewin, Superannuation: A Practical Approach
(Melbourne: Leo Cussen, 1981) at 3. One practical consequence that flows from a trust
characterization is illustrated in Case G20 (1975) 75 A.T.C. 118, where the Board of Review
assessed a superannuation fund that failed to qualify for concessional tax treatment as a trust, using
the trust provisions of the income tax legislation.
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eventually formulated, 77 but the principal source of regulation was the
income tax legislation that established ground rules for eligibility for the
tax-free status sought by superannuation funds. The legislation was
deliberately broad and vague, however, and it left to the Commissioner
of Taxation the task of promulgating guidelines for the conditions that
superannuation funds had to meet in order to qualify for tax exemption.
For the most part, guidelines issued by the Taxation Office were
concerned with mandatory and prohibitory investment policies. For
example, they stipulated the minimum percentage of invested funds that
had to be placed in government securities and the maximum percentage
that could be invested in or loaned to the employer or a related party.
The guidelines did not address substantive issues related to the
rights of fund beneficiaries, and most funds contained some exploitive
features. Vesting periods for employer contributions ranged from
somewhat lengthy to obscenely long. (Ten- to fifteen-year vesting
periods were not uncommon, and some funds stipulated twenty-five-year
vesting periods.) Returns on employee contributions were often
minimal and sometimes zero. In some cases, in both the private and
public sectors, funds charged management or administrative fees, so
departing employees actually received less than they had contributed.
The combination of inordinately long vesting periods and
conservative actuarial estimates meant that many defined benefit
superannuation funds accumulated significant surpluses. Employers in
need of extra capital on occasion, sought to withdraw the surpluses,
though their attempts were often challenged, rarely with success, by
unions on behalf of beneficiaries.
The most unfortunate consequence of the government's
hands-off approach to superannuation fund regulation was the rise of
"cherry picker" funds in the tax avoidance era of the 1970s and early
1980s. These funds were established by small businesses to exploit
simultaneously all of the weaknesses of the superannuation regime: long
vesting periods, tax exemption of contributions and earnings, and
generous concessions on distributed benefits. Employers who
established cherry picker funds generally made the entire workforce
members of the scheme, often without their knowledge. Employees who
might achieve continuity of service sufficient for vesting were dismissed
shortly before the requisite time, and when only the employer and close
family members remained as potential beneficiaries, the funds were
wound up. The benefits were distributed as lump sums to the remaining
77 See I. Wallschutzky, "Taxation Aspects of Retirement and Superannuation" in R. Krever,
ed.,Australian Taxation Principles and Practice (Melbourne: Longman, 1987) 256 at 256-57.
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members, and for reasons explained below, were largely tax-free.
Apart from changes in the legislation to deal with such blatant
tax avoidance schemes, no attempts were made to codify rules for the
operation of superannuation funds eligible for tax exemption. The
Commissioner's guidelines and rulings were similarly directed at
exploitive and abusive schemes, and, apart from some rules on eligible
investments and caps on maximum investment contributions, did not
address any policy issues. Thus, when Labor was elected to power in
1983, superannuation funds operated without constraints on vesting
periods, portability rights (the right to transfer entitlements to a new
fund on change of employment), or preservation conditions (the
obligation to retain tax-exempt savings until retirement).
2. Superannuation savings: the pre-1983 taxation system
The tax concessions that encouraged retirement savings by
means of superannuation funds covered four discrete areas: (1) the
treatment of employer remuneration deposited directly into a
superannuation fund; (2) the treatment of employee contributions to
superannuation fund; (3) the taxation of investment income derived by
the funds; and (4) the taxation of benefits received by a member from a
concessionally treated superannuation fund.
1. Employer contributions. From its inception, Australian income tax
legislation provided special treatment for employers' contributions to
superannuation funds. Employers' contributions to the funds were
deductible to the" employers7s and exempt from taxation when received
by the funds.
2. Employee contributions. The 1915 Tax Act allowed employees and
self-employed persons a deduction for contributions made to a
superannuation fund. The deduction was replaced by a rebate (tax
credit) in 1942, which was replaced in turn by a deduction in 1951. In
the 1970s, the deduction was again abandoned in favour of a rebate, and
in the 1980s, a system of rebates and deductions was adopted.79 The
value of the relief was restricted to relatively small contributions, and for
employees in employer-sponsored funds, it eventually disappeared
78 Income TaxAssessmentAcl (Australia) 1915, s. 18(f) [hereinafter 1915 TaxAct].
79 For a brief history of the switch back and forth from deductions to rebates see Asprey
Report, supra note 16, para. 21.31. TheAsprey Report incorrectly identifies the deduction available
in the 1915 TaxAct as a maximum of £100; it was actually limited to a maximum of £50: see the
1915 TaxAct, ibid., s. 18(g).
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altogether (to be revived to a small extent in 1990). The role played by
the deductions or rebates for employees in encouraging retirement
savings was minor.
Surprisingly, organized labour and employers alike failed to
appreciate the advantages they both could secure through the use of
employer-funded superannuation funds. Both public and private sector
employers required significant employee contributions, a condition to
which representative unions invariably acquiesced.
3. Fund earnings. The 1915 Tax Act included an exemption for
investment income derived by superannuation funds,8 0 and the
exemption survived in successor legislation. Provided that a fund
satisfied the minimal regulatory standards imposed by the Tax Office, it
was completely exempt from income taxation.
4. Superannuation benefits. The key to the distinctiveness of the
Australian retirement savings system was an apparently innocuous
provision inserted in the original 1915 TaxAct, which included only 5 per
cent in assessable income "of the capital amount of a retiring allowance
or gratuity which is paid in a lump sum."81 When the section was first
enacted, few employees were members of superannuation funds and
lump-sum retirement payments were usually "golden handshakes," not
distributions of accrued savings and earnings. From a modern public
finance perspective in which income is synonymous with economic gain
the 5 per cent inclusion provision seems excessively generous. At the
time, however, the taxation of even part of a capital payment was a
notable base-broadening initiative. Nevertheless, the effect of the 5 per
cent inclusion was, of course, to exclude from taxable income 95 per cent
of such payments.8 2
The lump-sum superannuation benefits to which the 5 per cent
rule applied consisted of three elements: untaxed employer
contributions, untaxed superannuation fund earnings, and after-tax
employee contributions. The lump-sum tax contained no dissection
formula. Accordingly, to the extent that it applied to previously taxed
employee contributions, it amounted to a double tax. Such contributions
constituted a small part of most lump sums, however, and the injustice
was more than offset by the 95 per cent exemption side.
The interplay of tax and superannuation rules is something of a
80 bid, s. 11(f).
8 1 Ibid., s. 14(l).
82 The exclusion effect was confirmed in Reseck v. F.C.T. (1975), 5 A.I.T.R. 538, when the
Commissioner failed to assess 5 per cent under the lump-sum provision and the remainder under a
general charging provision.
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chicken-or-egg question, but most observers conclude that the 5 per cent
tax rule is the single most important factor behind the common
availability of lump-sum benefits from Australian superannuation funds.
The option to commute all pension rights to a lump-sum entitlement is
not uncommon, and lesser commuting rights, often for 50 per cent or 75
per cent of pension rights, are available from most funds that do not
offer the option of 100 per cent commuting.
We mentioned earlier the perverse manner in which the option
of a lump-sum superannuation benefit operated in conjunction with the
aged pension provisions. There was every reason to use any lump-sum
benefit received and thus, qualify for the pension. The pension was seen
as a fair return on a lifetime of taxation, and consequently loss of
entitlement was widely perceived as an effective tax.
Tax policy analysts recognized the illogic of the 95 per cent
lump-sum exclusion, and the first government commission to examine
the income tax system after the Second World War, the Spooner
Committee, strongly criticized the concession.83 It recommended that
the 5 per cent inclusion system be capped; and proposed the adoption of
a formula under which the maximum lump sum that could be sheltered
under the 5 per cent inclusion provision would be set at the equivalent of
one year's salary for each eight years of service, subject to an overall
maximum of $30,000. Proceeds that exceeded the ceiling would be fully
taxed. The government endorsed the sentiment of the Spooner
Committee's recommendations but it reduced the value of the
concessionally taxed component significantly by adopting a formula of
one year's salary for every twenty years of service, subject to an upper
limit of $20,000.
The Bill containing the proposed changes provoked a chorus of
protests when the government introduced it into Parliament in 1952. Its
opponents criticized the absence of grandfathering provisions and its
consequent reduction of after-tax benefits of existing superannuation
fund members. Furthermore, it was argued, in a context of high
marginal tax rates (the top rate was then almost 70 per cent) the
proposed changes could lead to a severe bunching problem. The
government yielded to the storm and deleted the retirement benefits
provisions from the Bill.
The combination of generous tax concessions, minimal statutory
rules, and weak Tax Office guidelines invited avoidance, an invitation
that many taxpayers accepted. The Ligertwood Committee, a tax-review
83 Australia, Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Taxation (Canberra: Government
Printer, 1951) (Chair: E.S. Spooner).
1993]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
committee appointed in late 1959, exposed many of the most abusive
avoidance schemes, but the committee's recommendations, released in
1961, led to only minor legislative and administrative reforms.
8 4
In 1972, a new tax-review committee, the Asprey Committee,
was appointed. The committee's final report, issued in 1975,85 offered
two alternative paths to the reform of retirement savings. Under the
first plan, lump-sum benefits would be assessable in full, subject to
generous averaging provisionss 6 and transitional provisionsF7 Under the
second plan, lump sums would be exempt up to a given figure (the
Committee suggested $50,000), and amounts in excess of that figure
would be subject to forward averaging.
Almost none of the Asprey Committee's recommendations on
retirement savings and benefits or other matters were implemented. A
Labor government elected in late 1972 came into office with a
comprehensive tax reform agenda but was dismissed from office by the
Governor-General in 1975 before implementing serious changes. A
Liberal-dominated coalition formed an interim government pending
elections from which the coalition emerged victorious. Inhibited by the
questionable legitimacy of its road to power, the coalition government
moved cautiously on most fronts and hardly at all in the area of tax
reform. Legislative inaction contrasted with judicial activism to
dismantle the narrow tax base the legislature had adopted, and the result
was a decade of unprecedented avoidance and evasion, the former at
least unambiguously endorsed by the judiciary.
3. The first Labor reform package
When Labor returned to power in early 1983, the government
chose retirement savings as the subject of its first major tax reform
initiative. In mid-May 1983, the Treasurer announced the government's
intention to tax lump-sum retirement payments in full, subject to special
rate ceilings. The proposals generated a barrage of criticism by vested
interests, and by August, the Treasurer had retreated significantly,
proposing a 30 per cent maximum rate applicable to lump sums received
84 See Australia, Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Taxation (Canberra:
Government Printer, 1961) (Chair- G.C. Ligertwood) at 150-157.
85Asprey Report, supra note 16.
8 6 Ibid., paras. 21.68-21.77.
8 7ibid, paras. 21.80-21.91.
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by taxpayers under fifty-five and a dual-rate maximum tax applicable to
taxpayers fifty-five or older. For these taxpayers, a concessional
maximum rate of 15 per cent would apply to the first $50,000 of
lump-sum benefits and a 30 per cent maximum rate would apply to
benefits in excess of $50,000 (later raised to $55,000).
The new rates would apply only to lump-sum retirement
payments received after 30 June 1983 (the Australian tax year runs from
1 July to 30 June). Grandfathering rules would be adopted for pre-July
1983 benefits. The August announcement proposed a pro-rata grand-
fathering formula based on the taxpayer's pre- and post-membership
periods. Thus, for example, if a taxpayer had accrued twenty years of
fund membership before 1 July 1983 and remained in the fund for a
further ten years, two-thirds of his or her final benefit would be taxed
under the old 5 per cent rule and one-third under the new system. The
generosity of the grandfathering provision surprised many
commentators. It not only maintained the 95 per cent exemption for
benefits accrued before July 1983, but it extended the generous
treatment to a portion of all subsequent eamings.s
The original reform proposal, announced in mid-May, provided
a lump sum roll-over for taxpayers joining new superannuation funds,
but commentators suggested the concession would be of limited value,
given the number of taxpayers who moved to new employment with
firms that had existing superannuation plans, or whose superannuation
funds did not make provision for transfers from other funds.
The Treasbrer's August announcement on the new lump-sum tax
rates addressed these criticisms by establishing a new class of retirement
savings vehicles: approved deposit funds (ADFs). These could act as
holding vehicles for lump-sum benefits awaiting reinvestment in another
superannuation fund or in a retirement annuity policy. The concept
caught the imagination of the public and the investment community,
which quickly laid the groundwork for a range of ADFs, which offered
tax-free savings in a variety of portfolios, including debt, equity (both
foreign and domestic), and real estate. From a modest start, the ADF
industry grew quickly.
Early in 1984, Parliament adopted legislation that gave effect to
the government's reform proposals from 1 July 1983.
8 8 The use of a generous grandfathering system established a precedent for Labor tax reform
that has been followed many times since. The most notable example was the capital gains tax, which
exempted all gains on assets owned prior to the date of commencement of the tax.
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4. The second Labor reform package
The 1983 tax changes did not address a number of key questions
raised by the special tax rules for superannuation, and critics of the
concessions, particularly in the welfare sector, campaigned for further
changes.8 9
The critics adopted a tax-expenditure analysis and studied the
concessions as subsidies. To the extent that the post-reform system
retained a partial exclusion for lump-sum payments, the critics regarded
the superannuation tax system as a tax-exemption system. To the extent
that the post-July 1983 component of lump sums became taxable and all
pensions were taxable, they described the tax concessions as a deferral of
tax, akin to an interest-free loan, not available to gains realized on all
other types of savings.
Given a tax-expenditure analysis, the critics said, the concessions
could be rationalized as a subsidy for retirement savings intended to
encourage and assist taxpayers to save for retirement. Viewed in this
light, they argued, the scheme suffered from two principal defects: its
"upside-down" effect and the lack of targeting in its application. 90 In
regard to the first point, the critics noted that the value of the
interest-free loan diminished with income and fell to nothing for those
with incomes below the tax threshold. Thus, the concessions provided
large subsidies for those least in need of assistance and no subsidies for
those most in need.
The tax rules were also deficient from a targeting perspective.
To begin with, the critics noted, the provision of subsidies bore no
relation to need. The government not only gave more help to
higher-income taxpayers, but made no attempt to restrict access to the
subsidy to taxpayers who needed no help to save for retirement. The
critics called for caps on subsidized savings to limit exploitation by
taxpayers who could and would save outside the subsidy system.
The critics of the tax concessions also argued that they should be
targeted to savings in superannuation funds whose rules clearly
furthered the goals of providing adequate retirement income. They
called for certain restrictions on qualifying superannuation funds. The
89 See, for example, Brotherhood of St. Laurence, Tax Refomi, Jobs and Justice: Princples,
Issues and Directions for Change (Submission to the Economic Advisory Council, January 1985)
[unpublished].
90 See, for example, Y. Grbich & J. Grbich, "Tax Expenditures as a Regulatory Too]:
Targeting Superannuation Dollars" (1984) 1 Aust. Tax F. 96; and R. Krever, "Tax Expenditures:
The Other Spending Programme" (1985) 10 Legal Service Bulletin 63 at 66.
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proposed restrictions related to four matters: vesting, preservation,
portability, and the type of benefit a fund could provide.
The critics called for the imposition of strict vesting periods on
qualifying funds. If immediate vesting was not feasible, no more than a
minimal waiting period should be allowed. The call for preservation
rules arose from a perception that many people were using
superannuation funds as short-term, tax-exempt savings vehicles.
Existing superannuation deed rules did not guarantee that the funds
would remain invested until they were needed for retirement, even
though the principal rationale for the tax concession was the
subsidization of savings for retirement income.
Problems with portability were tied to the vesting and
preservation questions. Few funds provided for portability of
beneficiaries' entitlements to accrued vested rights and virtually none
provided for portability of non-vested accrued benefits. For employees
whose interests in employer contributions and a share of fund earnings
had not vested when they changed employment, the lack of portability
ensured the loss of their accrued but non-vested benefits. Employees
with vested interests in funds with no portability rules had no choice but
to cash out their benefits when changing employment.
Finally, the critics argued that subsidies should not be available
where superannuation funds offered lump-sum benefits. Lump-sum
benefits, largely a product of historical accident, could not be justified as
an appropriate tool for providing security from retirement until death.
Apart from its taxation power and perhaps its commerce power,
the federal government had no legal right to police or to establish
standards for superannuation funds. However, the income tax
legislation afforded the Commissioner of Taxation considerable latitude
in determining which funds qualified for tax exemption. As a result, the
Tax Office's unofficial standards became the de facto rules with which
superannuation funds had to comply. Most of the rules were designed to
combat tax avoidance or exploitation of the exemption; they dealt with
such things as loan-backs to the employer and direct or indirect
investment in the employer or a related party. The Tax Office also
sought to establish minimal prudential standards by stipulating minimum
investment levels in government debt. Not surprisingly, many
commentators suggested that the motive for this rule was to reduce the
government's borrowing costs, not to improve the funds' security. The
rules did not address important substantive issues such as vesting,
preservation, and portability.
One important function of the Commissioner's rules was to place
a cap on access to the tax concession by imposing "benefit limits" on
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funds eligible for tax concessions. The limits referred to the maximum
lump sum that could accrue for a beneficiary in a tax-exempt
superannuation fund. Analogous limits were established for pension
benefits and combination lump-sum and pension benefits.
The Tax Office originally adopted a "progressive" scale to
establish maximum benefits, although it had no legislative authorityfor
this innovation. The scale defined maximum lump-sum benefits as
multiples of final average salary, starting with seven times final average
salary for salaries of $27,000 or less. A progressively smaller multiple
applied to each step of additional salary. The upper limit for the largest
multiple was $192,500, for taxpayers with a final average salary of
$27,000, and the lower limit for the smallest multiple was $340,250, for
taxpayers with a final average salary of $90,500. In 1985, the
Commissioner of Taxation gave the regressivity of the superannuation
tax concession an unexpected and unexplained boost by replacing the
tapering limit scale with a flat rate, seven-times-final-average-salary
formula. The benefit limit for a taxpayer with a final average salary of
$27,500 continued to be $192,500. However, the benefit limit for a
taxpayer with a final average salary of $90,500 rose from $340,250 to
$633,500.
The 1983 "reform" of superannuation fund taxation had minimal
impact on the cost of the superannuation subsidy. In 1981-82 the
deferral of tax on taxable benefits and the 95 per cent exemption for
lump-sum benefits amounted to a $2.4 billion tax expenditure.9 1 By
1984-85, the tax expenditure had risen to an estimated $3 billion
annually,92 and some observers considered even that estimate to be a
conservative one.93 The financial pressure of maintaining the subsidy
was supplemented by increasing political pressure as the union
movement and welfare lobby pressed for reform, particularly with regard
to vesting, preservation, and portability standards. It was inevitable that
superannuation reform would find itself back on the government's
agenda.
Renewed action became imperative in mid-1985 when the ACTU
made superannuation a key bargaining point in its ongoing negotiations
91 Grbich & Grbich, ibid. at 116.
9 2 Treasurer, News Release (5 March 1986).
93 D. Dixon, "Suggested Refinements of the Treasury Costings of the Occupational
Superannuation Tax Concessions" (1986) 3 Aust. Tax F. 223. However, Knox suggests the Treasury
estimates may have been high; he estimates the concession to be about $2 billion annually. See D.
Knox, Taxation Support of Superannuation in Australia: Its Costs, Equity and Efficacy (Sydney:
A.T.R.F., 1987) at 36.
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with the government for a renewed wages accord and wage-tax trade off.
Two important elements of the 1985 agreement between the government
and the ACTrU were the adoption of operational standards for the vesting,
preservation, and portability of superannuation funds, and a proposed 3
per cent productivity award in the form of contributions to industry-
based superannuation funds (that is, funds in which the union movement
had some or even substantial influence).
94
In June 1986, the Treasurer announced both a draft version of
the new operational standards and his government's intention to
establish an Occupational Superannuation Commission, which would
monitor the new standards and introduce further appropriate
standards.95 Many observers thought the proposed standards were
weak. For example, although the standards required a 100 per cent
immediate vesting of new productivity fund contributions by employers,
they were silent on other employer contributions.
Pending establishment of the Occupational Superannuation
Commission, an interim body in the Treasury promulgated initial
guidelines, which were released in the second half of 1986 and early in
1987. The guidelines did not tread on sensitive areas; they applied for
the most part on a prospective basis to funds established after the
Treasurer's December 1985 announcement, and most of the conditions
they imposed, such as immediate vesting for employee contributions,
were hardly onerous.
By May 1987, when legislation was introduced to establish the
Commission, the scope of the proposed office had broadened somewhat.
The new law established the office of the Insurance and Superannuation
Commissioner, which combined the functions of the proposed
Superannuation Commission with an existing Life Insurance
Commission, Insurance Commission, and Government Actuary. The
legislation contained no superannuation operating standards. Instead, it
established a formal framework for the Insurance and Superannuation
Commission to issue prescribed standards as regulations under an
Occupational Superannuation Standards Act.
The extension of occupational superannuation and the
promulgation of new operating standards for new funds did little to
reduce the pressure for further reform. The concerns of the critics were
not new: inadequate vesting, persevation, and portability standards; the
continuing bias towards lump-sum benefits; and the inequitable and
9 4 Treasurer, News Release (16 December 1985).
95 Treasurer, News Release (11 June 1986).
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inefficient subsidy nature of the tax concessions, which provided greater
assistance to taxpayers with higher incomes and no benefit to those most
in need. In regard to the last point, the critics directed their concern at
both the "upside-down" nature of the tax deferral benefit for any given
amount of savings, and the fact that the "seven times" rule allowed
concessional savings to rise as income increased.
The pace of discussion increased when the government indicated
that it would unveil a major economic and tax reform programme in the
first half of 1988. Speculation followed in the financial press about the
possibility of the full or partial removal of the tax exemption for
superannuation contributions and earnings. Proposals for the full
taxation of superannuation fund income had first become prominent in
1981, when the Campbell Committee called for a tax on superannuation
funds to establish neutrality in the field of retirement savings between
investments through funds and direct investments. 6  Calls for a
superannuation fund tax were renewed in a number of academic papers
in the mid-1980s.97 Proponents of the tax gained considerable support
when New Zealand decided in December 1987 to end its tax concessions
for superannuation savings.
The theoretical rationale for fund taxation-to establish
capital-market neutrality-was perhaps less interesting to the
government than two important, pragmatic considerations. The first was
revenue potential. By moving the tax up front, from the distribution of
benefits to the original derivation of income, the government could
accelerate revenue collection and, by reducing the benefits of deferral,
reduce the overall costs of the concession. Immediate revenue gains
were important, given the government's plan to slash the corporate tax
rate. The second consideration was that a tax on superannuation funds
would greatly alleviate the serious problem of dividend streaming.
Under the imputation system adopted in July 1987, taxable shareholders
were fully credited for company taxes previously paid on distributed
income. The credits for company taxes were lost when such income was
distributed to tax-exempt shareholders. Streaming involved the selective
distribution of fully taxed company income to taxable shareholders and
untaxed company income to tax-exempt shareholders.
A succession of anti-streaming measures had proved ineffective;
96 Australian Financial System Inquiry, Final Report of the Committee of biquiry (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981) at 248.
97 See, for example, I. Harper, "Taxation and Superannuation: A Review of Recent
Developments" in R. Mendelsohn, ed., Finance of OldAge (Canberra: A.N.U., 1986) 133 at 139;
and Knox, supra note 93 at 46.
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taxpayers devised new arrangements to counter each new amendment.
Commentators in the financial press had argued that the only solution
was to impose the income tax on superannuation funds while offering
the funds access to imputation credits, since the funds would then seek
distributions of fully taxed income to the same extent as other taxable
shareholders.
It was clear to many observers concerned with the equity and
efficiency aspects of retirement savings subsidies that a tax on
superannuation funds would violate both of those norms. So long as the
tax was below the highest personal marginal rate, the subsidy would be
skewed towards high-income savers. The inequity of an upside-down
subsidy system would be mirrored by its inefficiency; those least in need
of assistance would receive the largest subsidies, whereas those most in
need would receive nothing.
Proposals to tax the funds did not engender opposition, however,
from the two groups whose constituencies stood to suffer most if a tax
were implemented: the ACTU, which represented organized labour, and
the Australian Council of Social Service (Acoss), which concerned itself
with the position of low-income earners. Concerned primarily with the
goal of spreading superannuation coverage, the ACrU seemed not to
appreciate the significance of the tax concessions inherent in the existing
tax system. ACOSS suggested that it would accept a proposal to impose a
flat-rate tax on superannuation funds9s if the tax were accompanied by
new limits on lump-sum benefits, caps on the subsidized benefits
available to high-income taxpayers, and increases in government
assistance provided to low-income people during retirement-or, at
worst, no decline in the level of assistance.
Given that, as a subsidy instrument a tax on superannuation
funds would be both inequitable and inefficient, ACOSS explained its
support on broader macroeconomic grounds: "The strongest argument
for taxing fund earnings is to remove investment distortion." 99 ACOSS
realized, however, that distortions could not be fully eliminated unless
funds were taxed at the corporate tax rate, which was then aligned with
the highest personal marginal tax rate. Of course, the higher the rate
imposed on superannuation funds, the greater the inequity for the tax on
low-income taxpayers.
As support grew for the superannuation fund tax proposals,
some critics of the existing system canvassed an alternative proposal.
98 ACOSS, Reform of Superannuation Tax Concessions: An Acoss Submission to the Federal
Government (Paper No. 13) (March 1988) at 21.
99 1bid,
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This proposal addressed the equity and efficiency problems directly by
calling for the scrapping of the existing concession and the adoption of a
tax-credit-based systemj °°
A number of versions of the tax-credit-based proposal appeared.
While they varied in detail, they all exhibited the same basic features.
Superannuation funds would be treated as flow-through entities, and
both employer contributions and fund earnings would be attributed
directly to beneficiaries for tax purposes. In the case of defined
contribution or accumulation funds, income would be allocated on an
exact basis. In the case of defined benefit funds, attributed income
would be calculated on the basis of the actuarially determined increase
in benefit rights. Allocated or attributed income would be taxed directly
in the hands of beneficiaries at their ordinary marginal rates. Provision
for the payment of members' tax liabilities by superannuation funds may
be desirable where taxpayers face liquidity problems.
To encourage superannuation savings, refundable tax credits
would be available to beneficiaries of approved funds. Since the tax
concession would take the form of a credit rather than a deduction,
exemption, or low tax rate, it would be of equal value to all taxpayers
regardless of their marginal tax rates. Use of a refundable credit would
extend the concession and the incentive to save to persons below the tax
threshold. Moreover, as a fixed credit, the concession would
automatically be capped; taxpayers could save as much as they wished,
but the government subsidy would be limited to the available credit.
Finally, appropriate standards could easily be imposed by
allowing taxpayers to use the credits only to offset tax on income
attributed or allocated by approved superannuation funds, that is, those
funds that met the appropriate vesting, preservation, and portability
standards. Similarly, once an appropriate benefit policy had been
selected (pension only or pension and a nominal lump-sum entitlement),
that policy could be made a condition of approval.
Although the credit-based system received some attention from
academic lawyers and economists, it was not endorsed by any of the key
sector organizations. ACOSS did use the occasion of its submission to
describe the credit-based system, however, and it went so far as to
suggest that it might be necessary to replace the existing system of
1 0 0 D. Dixon, Superannuation and Social Welfare Outlays (Paper presented to the Public Sector
Policy Symposium of the 15th Conference of Economists, 1986) [unpublished]; D. Dixon,
"Retirement Savings" in Head, ed., supra, note 63 at 195-202; G. Cooper & R. Krever, Australian
Tax Reform: The Unfinished Agenda (Paper presented to the Public Sector Management Institute
Conference, February 1988) [unpublished]; and R. Krever, "An immoral welfare program" (1988) 7
Aust. Soc. 9.
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concessions with such a system if a superannuation fund tax were
adopted.101
In May 1988, the Treasurer released details of the foreshadowed
taxation and economic reform programme. Its central element was a
reduction in the company tax rate from 49 per cent to 39 per cent at an
estimated annual revenue cost of about $1.5 billion. Company tax
base-broadening measures recouped $0.6 billion of the revenue losses
and a tax on superannuation fund contributions and earnings was
proposed to fund the remaining loss, $0.9 billion.10 2 Thus, the changes
in the superannuation tax concessions were driven, in the first instance,
by the need to fund cuts in the company tax.
The Treasurer's statement proposed a 15 per cent tax on fund
contributions that were deductible to the contributor and a similar tax
on fund earnings. It also proposed certain corollary changes in the
taxation of superannuation benefits: the generous 95 per cent
exemption for the portion of lump-sum benefits based on employment
before July 1983 would not be touched, but the maximum rates on post
June 1983 components would be altered to take into account the tax
already levied on the income at the fund level. At the same time, the
threshold between the low lump-sum rate and the high lump-sum rate
would be raised from $55,000 to $60,000. Provision was also made for
indexing the threshold. Superannuation pensions were to be fully taxed
(apart from the portion that represented the return of the pensioner's
non-deducted contributions). However, taxpayers would be entitled to a
credit to offset the effect of the tax previously imposed at the fund level.
The new rates on superannuation lump-sum and pension
benefits were based on the assumption that all superannuation
contributions and earnings had been subject to the new 15 per cent tax,
which clearly would not be the case for many years. The reductions in
the tax rate on benefits would be phased in over five years, a transition
period whose brevity conferred a significant windfall on taxpayers to the
extent that their final benefits represented contributions or earnings
derived before July 1988.
Although the superannuation fund tax slightly lessened the
deferral advantage of superannuation savings for the highest-bracket
taxpayers, it did not address the inequities or inefficiencies of the
previous system. The amount of tax deferred was reduced slightly, but
its magnitude increased with the beneficiary's marginal tax bracket. The
101 ACOSSsupra note 98.
102 Economic Statement May 1988, supra note 46.
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skewing of benefits toward upper-income taxpayers was compounded by
the retention of maximum rates on lump-sum earnings that were well
below the highest marginal income tax rates. For many lower-bracket
taxpayers, indeed, the 15 per cent tax on funds wiped out the
concessional element of superannuation savings.
The government's concession to the welfare lobby's criticism of
the upside-down effect of the tax subsidy concession system was the
adoption, in the 1988 reform package, of new limits on a taxpayer's
ability to exploit superannuation funds as concessional savings vehicles.
These were known as reasonable benefit limits (RBIs). RLs are based on
the expected present value (or lump-sum value) of a taxpayer's
superannuation entitlement at the time of retirement. Enforcement of
RBI.s is achieved through two means. First, superannuation funds that
permit excess contributions may be denied tax-preferred status. Second,
excess benefits are fully taxed as ordinary income at the recipient's
marginal tax rate. The double taxation of such benefits (that is, the
absence of any credit for taxes imposed at the fund level) is designed to
offset roughly the benefit of deferral that results from the low rate of tax
imposed on the fund.
Like their predecessors, the new limits were based on a multiple
of final average salary. However, the multiples declined on a progressive
basis with salary-the RBts ranged from seven times final average salary
until $35,000 to three times the excess over $65,000. The cut-in points
for declining multiples were indexed from July 1988. Analogous
multiples applied to pension benefits. Benefits subject to the RBL rules
did not include non-deductible employee contributions that attracted no
tax concessions.
The previous benefit limits allowed a taxpayer with a final
average salary of $100,000 to accumulate in a tax-exempt
superannuation fund savings sufficient to generate a lump-sum benefit
of $700,000. Under the 1988 RBL rules (if one ignored the indexation of
the brackets), the limit for the same taxpayer was $500,000.103 The pre-
1988 RBL rules allowed a taxpayer with a final average salary of $500,000
to accumulate a lump sum of $3.5 million; the 1988 limit for such a
taxpayer was $1.7 million °4
The 1988 "reforms" did little to ameliorate the inequities and
inefficiencies of the superannuation tax subsidy program. Critics argued
that the subsidy continued to have the "upside-down" effect
103 Seven times $35,000 plus five times $30,000 plus three times $35,000 = $500,000.
104 Seven times $35,000 plus five times $30,000 plus three times $435,000 = $1,700,000.
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characteristic of many tax expenditures and that the caps on exploitation
by higher-income taxpayers were both insufficient and ineffective. Once
again, the reform process had failed to endorse measures to discourage
lump-sum benefits. Only limited progress had been made on
preservation and portability, and even some employers' representatives
acknowledged that the rules on vesting remained ineffective. 10 5
In October 1988, the Social Security Review issued a study
entitled Towards a National Retirement Incomes Policy.10 6 The paper
dealt with both government transfer payments and private retirement
savings. It focused on the disincentives, inequities, and inefficiencies
caused by the unplanned and often anomalous interaction of the two.
The paper's release renewed the public debate on retirement savings
and transfer payments programmes as Parliament debated the May 1988
superannuation tax changes.
In August 1989, the Minister for Social Security unveiled the
government's new retirement incomes policy. The new policy put
considerable emphasis on reducing the high, effective marginal tax rates
imposed on pensioners when additional income triggering pension
reductions was also taxed.
In announcing its new initiative, the government acknowledged
the criticisms that had been levelled against the superannuation
concession but defended its policies. In particular, it reaffirmed its
commitment to providing taxpayers with the option of receiving
lump-sum benefits. Rather than further restrict or penalize lump sums,
the government proposed adopting more lenient RBLs for savings in
superannuation funds, which provided more than half the benefit as a
pension. It also tightened further vesting, preservation, and portability
standards, though the rules remained woefully inadequate.
Finally, the government announced its intention to extend tax
concessions for superannuation contributions by employees. For
self-employed taxpayers and employees whose employers made no
contributions on their behalf to superannuation funds, the deduction for
contributions would be enlarged from $3,000 per year to $3,000 plus 75
per cent of any contributions in excess of $3,000, up to the reasonable
benefits limits. Deductions for superannuation contributions would be
extended to other employees for the first time, with a sliding scale of
105 See, for example, the position of the Business Council, an influential commercial body, in
"New steps towards a Retirement Income Policy-A ten year reform program" (May 1989) 53 Bus.
Courn. Bulletin 14.
106 Australia, Towards a National Retirement Incontes Policy (Social Security Review Issues
Paper No. 6) by C. Foster (Canberra: Department of Social Security, 1988).
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allowable deductions; the maximum deduction would depend on the
level of employer superannuation support (as a percentage of salary).
This proposal suffered from a number of technical and related problems,
and it was replaced with a disappearing tax credit system for employees
who were members of employer-sponsored superannuation schemes. To
provide further opportunities for low-income taxpayers, particularly
part-time women workers, superannuation deductions were made
available to taxpayers who worked as little as ten hours a week. Special
deeming provisions provided these taxpayers with an RBL determined by
reference to a $25,000 "base salary."
The 1989 reforms further tidied the superannuation tax subsidy
system but failed to address its fundamental shortcomings1 0 7 In
addition, it continued to skew subsidies toward high-income taxpayers.
The government subsidy portion of a dollar contributed to a
superannuation fund would be 7.25 per cent for a taxpayer with an
income of $17,000 and 33.25 per cent for a taxpayer with an income in
excess of $35,000.108 The benefits in the form of a lump sum rather than
a pension were reduced, but the incentive to take almost half of the
available benefits as a lump sum remained. And the sliding scale
capping superannuation savings meant that the total subsidy, as well as
the subsidy per dollar invested, increased with the taxpayer's income and
ability to save.
Debate over the government's superannuation policy continued
throughout 1990 and early 1991. In the first half of 1991, a new proposal
emerged.10 9 This proposal called for two things: (1) replacement of the
3 per cent employer contribution negotiated in the context of the
national wage-setting system with a compulsory retirement savings
contribution scheme with higher contribution levels, and (2) elimination
of the current tax-subsidy system and its replacement with a credit-based
system.
To overcome any potential constitutional difficulties, the
proponents of the proposal advocated the adoption of a social security
levy that would operate as a sanction for non-compliance with the
107See R. Krever, "The plain guide to the super saga" (1989) 8 Aust. Soc. 36.
108 D. Dixon, Superannuation Strategies after the 1989 Budget (Paper prepared for the
University of Sydney Faculty of Law CLE seminar, Tax Law Treatment of Superannuation, Life
Insurance and Retirement Income: The Implications of the New Provisions and the 1989 Budget, 19
September 1990) [unpublished].
109 This proposal was raised in an early draft of this article, prepared for the Osgoode/Monash
symposium, Towards the 21st Century: Canadian-Australian Legal Perspectives, held in June 1991.
Drafts of the paper circulated in Australia in the months preceding the conference, that is, in the
first five months of 1991.
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expanded superannuation coverage standards. The levy would be
imposed on all employers, but employers who made sufficient
contributions to qualifying superannuation funds would qualify for a
complete rebate of the resulting tax. The tax collected from employers
who failed to make sufficient contributions would be deposited into
superannuation funds for the benefit of the employees identified as
insufficiently covered.
Growing awareness of the limitations of a system that relied on
industrial wage agreements as the basis for expanded superannuation
coverage caused the government to rethink its policies by mid-1991.
Proposals by the AcrU for a further 3 per cent employer's contribution to
be adopted as part of the national wages system110 were rejected by the
government and instead in the August 1991 budget, the Treasurer
revealed the government's intention to establish new minimum
compulsory superannuation contribution levels to be enforced by means
of a superannuation guarantee levy on employers whose contributions
fell below the minimum levels.
Full details of the government's proposals were released four
and a half months later, in December 1991.111 They were passed at the
end of that year and took effect from mid-1992. The compulsory
contribution scheme adopted resembled the model discussed outside
government circles in the first half of 1991 in most respects, but with
some significant differences-most importantly, the government's
proposal envisaged no change in the current tax-subsidy system. The
levy changed the contribution side of the retirement savings programme,
but it will preserve the program's inequitable and inadequate tax-subsidy
aspect.
The Government's response to continuing pressure for further
reform was the mid-1992. release of a new set of "simplification"
proposals, which were legislated later in that year.112  The most
important of these was the replacement of the climbing reasonable
benefit level limits with flat dollar limits from 1 July 1994. The initial
lump sum limit will be $400,000 and the initial pension scale limit will be
$800,000, with both amounts indexed. Taxpayers who have accrued
higher entitlements under the current rules will be allowed to retain the
higher entitlements. The Government also proposed to raise the
110 Supra note 42.
111 Australia, Superannuation Guarantee Levy Infonnation Paper by Hon. J. Kerin, Treasurer
(Canberra: Treasury, 1991).
112 Taxation LawsAmendment (Superannuation).,ct 1992.
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preservation age to sixty years over a period of thirty-two years.1 13
D. A Retirement Income Reform Programme for the 1990s and Beyond
Australia's programme for providing retirement income security,
in spite of recent reforms, is both inefficient and inequitable. It fails to
encourage sufficient deferral of consumption from employment years to
retirement years by those who need encouragement and assistance. It
fails to discourage the payment of lump-sum retirement benefits and it
encourages the rapid depletion of capital after retirement. It provides
inadequate security for people who have no other resources and
unjustifiable windfalls for those who can and will save for retirement
anyway. Finally, it establishes a large group of tax-preferred investors
(that is, superannuation funds), whose exploitation of arbitrage
opportunities biases and distorts the operation of the nation's capital
markets.
This part of the paper describes an alternative system, one that
can achieve the equity and efficiency that the current system lacks. The
model is based on a premise that we presented earlier, namely, that the
most effective redistribution programme is one that redistributes
economic opportunity and that recognizes periods of vulnerability over
the life cycle, including retirement. If everyone had access to sufficient
economic resources to fund both current consumption and retirement
savings, no further provision would be needed for direct or indirect
government assistance in the form of social security payments or tax
concessions.
Unfortunately, Australia's current redistributive programmes
have not established the fundamental access to economic opportunity
that would make a retirement income security system of this sort
possible. (Nor, for that matter, are they intended to accomplish this
result). Quite simply, too many persons have insufficient resources to
make provision for retirement savings. Many do not derive adequate
employment earnings, and others have no employment income. The
superannuation guarantee charge (as the levy was called in the enacting
legislation) will increase the number of workers with some
employer-sponsored savings, but coverage is likely to remain inadequate
for workers with very low wages and for those with marginal or
intermittent labour-market attachment. Some intervention is needed to
113 Statement by the Treasurer, 20 June 1992, Security in Retirement-Planningfor Tommorow
Today.
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assist those who are unable to put aside adequate resources to fund
future consumption. Moreover, the new levy system will be punitive in
respect to low-income employees, whose inadequate or marginally
adequate consumption resources will be reduced to the extent that
employers have sufficient leverage to trade off wage rises for increased
superannuation contributions. And finally, the compulsory savings
charge is unduly restrictive in relation to the range of savings needs of
different households across the life cycle.
The model we propose builds upon the recently adopted
compulsory employer contribution system. Our alternative model for
achieving the same objectives is a universal pension system funded either
from invested social security tax revenues (a fully funded scheme) or
current social security or income tax revenues (an unfunded scheme). A
universal pension system would not be as greatly dissimilar from the new
superannuation guarantee charge as many believe. A pension system
extracts provision for retirement savings from individuals through
compulsory levies. A guarantee levy system extracts contributions made
on a compulsory basis through regulations directed at employers, and
these regulations can be extended to employees as well. A pension
system can be redistributive if its benefits are approximately capped and
taxed, while the taxes used to fund the benefits, be they progressive
income taxes or progressive social security levies, are not capped. A
guarantee levy system can be redistributive if it directs appropriate
assistance and subsidies to those least able to make adequate
contributions to their retirement savings.
Examples of both systems may be found in a number of
jurisdictions, some of which rely on hybrids of the two. Either can
achieve the income security objective in an equitable and efficient
manner. One basis for choosing one over the other is political viability.
Which system is more likely to be achievable, given the current political
and social climate and the trends in retirement income savings that have
emerged over the past decade? And, in the context of an ageing society,
which system has the best prospects for surviving into the next century in
the face of the shifting agendas of competing political parties?
A lack of political viability is the flaw of the universal pension
option. In the current Australian political-economic climate,
universality is difficult to sell. There is increasing popular sentiment for
tax and expenditure reduction, and the provision of services on a user
fee basis, and for tightly targeted welfare and social security
programmes. The current subsidies for private superannuation savings
are hidden from popular scrutiny in the tax-expenditure budget. The
pension costs are subsumed in the general tax revenues. By contrast, the
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costs of a universal scheme would be visible whether they took the form
of a discrete levy, higher taxes, or constant taxes in a system in which
taxpayers have come to expect regular tax cuts as an alternative to
bracket indexation. In conclusion, the sentiment against universality
probably precludes serious consideration of a universal pension option.
A retirement income security system that took the form of an
expanded, (indeed, de facto universal) superannuation savings system
within the framework of an efficient and equitable tax subsidy regime
would have the following features:
1. The present compulsory employer contribution system, policed
by an alternative non-deductible levy, would be maintained as
the basis for initial contributions to retirement savings funds.
2. All contributions to funds and fund earnings would be fully taxed
to the individual beneficial owner at that taxpayer's ordinary
marginal rate. (Employees' contributions would be taxed, as at
present, prior to investment in the fund.) In the case of defined
contribution (accumulation) funds, actual contributions and
earnings would be attributed to each fund member. In the case
of defined benefit funds, the actuarial value of the year's increase
in entitlement would be assessed. The latter calculation is
administratively simple, provided that schemes are fully funded
and immediate vesting rules are enforced.1 14 This approach
addresses the problem of vertical inequity caused by the present
preferential tax-rate system and eliminates all market distortions
caused by the preferential position of institutional investors.
Liquidity problems that lower income taxpayers might face can
be solved by transferring the actual liability, once calculated at
the beneficiary's marginal rate, to the superannuation fund.
3. Taxpayer's retirement savings would be subsidized by means of a
diminishing, quarantined, universal, and refundable tax credit.
All contributions and earnings would be assessed, but taxpayers
could use the credit to offset some or all of the tax otherwise
payable on retirement savings. The credit would be a
diminishing one, so its value would gradually decline as current
income increased. Higher-income taxpayers need less assistance
114 Head has suggested that the technical difficulties of funded schemes with uncertain vesting
periods and unfunded schemes generally preclude the adoption of a full accruals method of
taxation, as advocated here. See J. Head, "Issues in Australian Tax Policy for the 1980s" in J. Head,
ed., Taxation Issues of the 1980s (Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1983) 1 at 4. The
solution, clearly, is not to abandon accruals for a rough approximation, which Head suggests is the
only alternative, but rather to adopt adequate vesting rules to simplify the determination of the
value of annual increments in entitlement.
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to save for retirement; it is easier for taxpayers with higher
incomes to defer some present consumption. The claw-back
calculation would be based on total income, not just employment
income. This provision would ensure that the subsidy would
diminish and eventually disappear for persons deriving income
from property as well as for persons deriving income from
employment or business. The credit would be quarantined, so it
could be used only to offset the tax liability imposed on
superannuation contributions or earnings. To the extent that the
credit exceeded the tax liability imposed on retirement savings, it
would be refundable, but the value of the refund would have to
be contributed directly to a superannuation fund. Contributions
funded by "refunded" credits would provide income security for
persons who had no other resources to set aside for old age.
Accordingly, it would be reasonable to restrict the type of funds
to which they could be contributed to ensure that they were not
transferred to risky or speculative funds. A preferable option
could be to establish a government-sponsored fund to which all
refunded credits would be directed automatically. The credit
would be universal, so it would be available to unemployed
persons and employees with low pay, who could thus establish
retirement savings entitlements. The credit would be
refundable, so it would provide tangible value to low-income
persons by generating investment funds for retirement savings
purposes. In the case of low-income employees, the availability
of the credit could be used to limit the level of employer
contribution required. This would minimize or eliminate the risk
of reduced current consumption that would otherwise follow if
the price extracted by employers for increased superannuation
contributions were lower wage rises.
4. The tax subsidy would be available only for contributions to, and
investment earnings by, complying funds. Compliance standards
would preserve retirement savings both until retirement and
thereafter until death. The standards would include immediate
vesting requirements, tighter preservation and portability
standards, and most importantly, a compulsory pension payout
for all benefits. In other words, no lump-sum option would be
available. Risk-adverse members could be given the option of a
slightly reduced pension and guaranteed minimum return, as is
now available to life annuity purchasers.
5. Credit levels would be determined by reference to the final
income level desired in respect of persons with no contributions
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apart from the refunded credit. For example, if it were decided
that a new superannuation pension equal to the current aged
pension (or to a multiple of the current aged pension) was
appropriate, credits would be set at a level such that the
refunded credits would be sufficient to fund the chosen pension
amount.
Further issues raised by the credit proposal include the
following:
1. Appropriate rules for secondary earners. Because their incomes
are low, secondary earners would be likely to qualify for the
credit subsidy. It might, therefore, be possible for high-income
households to exploit the credit, unless entitlement were based
on combined spousal income rather than the individual
taxpayer's income. On the other hand, there is no reason why
individual spouses should not have separate retirement income
entitlements; there is no guarantee that a current relationship
will still be in effect at the time of retirement. One approach
would be to provide primary earners with the choice of either an
individual or a higher spousal credit; the latter would be
available only where the non-working or the secondary-earner
spouse had a vested right in the superannuation entitlement of
the primary earner.
2. Appropriate transitional measures. The changes that have been
made in the superannuation system since 1988 would greatly
facilitate a change to a credit-based system. Already, most funds
are geared to accept employee contributions that are taxed at the
employee level. The administrative shift to taxing employer
contributions at the employee level would not pose undue
difficulty for either employers or employees. Although some
employers will have to increase their contributions to meet the
new standards, some current superannuation arrangements
already meet or exceed the standards, particularly in the case of
defined-benefit funds. In these cases, it would be necessary to
recalculate members' benefit entitlements to take into account
the non-taxation of benefits distributed to members. A similar
downward adjustment in entitlements was carried out in 1988
when a tax was first imposed on superannuation contributions
and fund earnings, and both the funds and their advisers are now
highly familiar with the logistics of altering entitlements and fund
deeds accordingly. The Insurance and Superannuation
Commissioner is equally experienced in supervising this sort of
change. Integration of the old and new superannuation systems
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would be simple from a tax perspective. If each fund member's
entitlement were determined as of the day the new regime came
into effect, only later contributions and earnings would be
included in the member's assessable income. To the extent that
benefits represented the post-credit system savings, they would
be tax exempt when distributed. To the extent that benefits were
derived from pre-credit system contributions and earnings, they
would continue to be taxable to employees. However, credit
would be available for the 15 per cent tax they bore prior to the
change to the new system.
3. The role of the pension. Over time, the new system would cover
an increasing proportion of the retired population. The existing
aged pension would become increasingly less important as a
means of ensuring income security for the retired. The aged
pension would nevertheless have an ongoing function because
the new, universal superannuation pensions would not be
adequate for all persons in the short to medium term. The new
superannuation system would be designed to achieve retirement
income security for persons who had made superannuation
contributions (either directly or by way of employer contribu-
tions) over a working life. It would, therefore, take at least a
generation for the new system to provide an adequate retirement
income for persons who did not enjoy adequate superannuation
coverage when the system was introduced. In the meantime, it
would be necessary to supplement the new superannuation
pension payments with the aged pension to raise total income up
to the current aged pension level or higher. There is a danger
that, as the relative importance of the aged pension decreased, it
would become marginalized in the sense that it would apply to
ever fewer and less influential persons. The risks are twofold.
First, as the importance of the aged pension diminished and it
applied to a decreasing number of persons, real pension levels
might not be sustained. The many people who currently receive
the aged pension constitute a significant and influential political
force. Second, the aged pension serves as the benchmark for a
number of other social security payments. If the real value of
aged pensions were to fall, so too would the value of other less
politically popular pensions and benefits.
These risks are real. However, it is important to realize that they
exist whether or not the system we propose is adopted. As inefficient and
inequitable as the current superannuation regime may be, it is the case
that it will apply to an ever-growing proportion of the population, and
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that the role of the aged pension will decline. More and more, the
persons who rely on the aged pension will be drawn from the
fringes-from those who were never employed or who were unemployed
for a significant part of their working lives, from immigrants whose
contributions to the superannuation system were minimal, and so forth.
The solution is to take the initiative now in redefining the role of the
aged pension. In the immediate future, the aged pension will continue
to provide the basis of an adequate level of retirement income. In the
longer term, the aged pension will act as a supplement that bridges the
shortfall between payments from the superannuation system and the
minimally acceptable income level. And, that level should be the
standard on which aged pension supplements and all other pensions and
benefits are based.
VII. DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
This paper has argued that one of the fundamental goals of
government activity should be to ensure equality of opportunity,
especially in relation to employment. It has demonstrated that taxation
and social security reform can advance that goal. Such reform should
aim to tackle the present features of the structure of Australia's taxation
system, which inhibit the long-term generation of employment through
sustained economic growth. Reform should also aim to improve both
the efficiency and equity of government assistance to people during
periods of reduced labour force participation or as a supplement to low
wages in certain circumstances. The combined impact of taxation and
social security arrangements should be the focus of this reform.
Problems with the present arrangements have been graphically
illustrated in the case study of retirement income in Part VI. This case
study pointed to the inequities and inefficiencies of the combined impact
of tax transfer arrangements, primarily but not solely as a result of the
structure of tax concessions for superannuation savings. Assistance
through the tax system is poorly targeted, giving preferential treatment
to high-income earners and, at the same time, providing little incentive
to preserve a regular income for the whole retirement period.
Part VI suggested an alternative approach to government
assistance for retirement incomes. Alongside the more general reforms
to both the taxation and social security systems that were outlined in
Part V, this would widen the scope and improve the quantum of
government assistance to redistribute. Tax reform is fundamental; it
cannot be achieved by social security reform alone. However, to go
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further, or even to achieve these changes, a wider community consensus
about the role of government and in particular, its redistributive
objectives is urgently needed. In the end, the most serious obstacle to
redistribution is lack of political will.

